In the many face-to-face conversations I have had with soldiers who have returned from captivity, I sensed that by knowing the nation stood behind them and was working to bring them home, they found the strength to overcome the torture and hardships they endured in captivity. Perhaps the late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin erred in 1985, during his tenure as defense minister, when he freed more than 1,150 terrorists in return for three Israeli soldiers in the prisoner exchange known as the Jibril Agreement, which set a precedent for the future. What's done is done, though, and we cannot abandon Gilad Shalit now because of a decision we suddenly want to revoke. We have already lost Ron Arad, despite the fact that early on the government tried to negotiate his release and had two opportunities to get out of that labyrinth. We must not lose Gilad because of the devious games Hamas is playing by setting a price for him. Instead, we must make the best deal possible under existing conditions, even if it ends up being costly for us. This has great implications for our soldiers and the unfortunate families involved. We appear to have passed the point of no return in this matter: Hamas is not going to offer us a better deal. If anything, the price is only going to increase from now on. Such is our enemy's nature; this is how they value human life. In statements that carry considerable moral and practical weight, several senior Shin Bet officials have said that Israel can withstand making the deal. It is true that there are many people who object to the proposed and complicated deal, among them top ministers. However, we all know that when it comes to weighty issues and difficult decisions, the prime minister makes the final call. He stands at the top of the pyramid and it is his prerogative to decide. In addition, in the event that prisoners who promise not to return to terrorist activities do so after their release, there are ways to deal with that. Even now, we can decide in principle that government policy on the matter be changed -- officially or unofficially -- immediately after Operation Return Shalit. Our formula for prisoner exchanges must follow that of other enlightened countries, the U.S. included: one for one. In other words, there can be no more deals in which they get 1,000 prisoners in exchange for giving us one. For years, the Israel Defense Forces' power has protected Israel, and once we chip away at that power, our enemies became emboldened. The same rule goes for prisoners. Once our enemies understand that we will not back down on the matter, they will adapt their behavior. To achieve this equation, we must once again adopt the method used in 1972, during an operation in which Sayeret Matkal commandos abducted five Syrian officers to use as bargaining chips for a swap with Damascus. If we repeat such an operation today and, in response, they kidnap an Israeli soldier or civilian at home or abroad, the IDF will respond harshly. A successful operation will serve as a significant deterrent that can completely change our enemy's behavior. I recently met with several graduates from Ron Arad's pilots' course, at their request. My conversation with these experienced fighters and close friends of Arad was open, honest, informative and without limitations. The message was clear: Let's not repeat the mistakes we made in the case of Ron Arad.
