How did Turkey and Israel go from being strategic partners of the first order to bitter rivals entrenched in a serious crisis? One of the answers lies in Turkey's foreign policy of late, adopted under the leadership of the Justice and Development party. The architect of Turkey's foreign policy, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, has outlined an aggressive strategy characterized by the demand that the U.S., Europe and Middle Eastern countries, including Israel, recognize Turkey's ability to play a central role in regional and international diplomacy and economies. Another unique element in Turkish policy is the ideology of strengthening Islamic civilization and increasing its own position within it. Davutoglu believes he can fulfill this vision by creating a new order in the Middle East, one that is based on economic integration and political stability. He and Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan are striving for strategic importance, pushed by a desire to expand their influence to transform Turkey into a central axis and crucial meeting point between Europe, the Middle East and the Caucasus. A central principle in Turkey's foreign policy is its zero problems with neighbors approach, in the sense that Turkey wants to solve problems and encourage stability around it to free itself from the old approach of being on the defensive. Following this line of thinking, Turkey established warmer ties with Middle Eastern countries such as Syria and Iran with the express purpose of playing a more dominant role in regional politics. It worked to keep its relations with Israel under wraps to show the Muslim world that it is more neutral. Moreover, Turkey began playing a role in a variety of regional issues, helping Iraqis negotiate that country's future and offering to mediate between various parties: between the U.S. and Iran over the latter's nuclear program, between Israel and Syria over peace, between Palestinian factions and between Israel and the Palestinians. The Turks view the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the main threat to the region's stability, and that drives their efforts to solve the dispute or at least reach a consensus. Turkey believes that dialogue with all parties is key to achieving maximum cooperation, and that approach extends to Hamas, which opposes a peace deal with Israel and refuses even to recognize its right to exist. The problem is that Turkish foreign policy also carries with it the risk of friction between Turkey and other countries in the event that diplomatic efforts fail or mediation is not enough to achieve a breakthrough. Such was the case when Turkey felt Israel's actions in Gaza damaged its mediation efforts. It is no coincidence that since 2005, when hostilities escalated between Israel and Hamas, relations deteriorated between Israel and Turkey. However, there is some room for optimism that relations might improve, even if recent days have brought us a further deterioration. Turkey and Israel must cooperate in light of events in the region, particularly the volatile situation in Syria. Assuming that President Bashar Assad's regime falls, both sides have an interest in ending Iran's influence in Syria. It is also safe to assume that the U.S. will urge its two main allies to reconcile, throwing its full weight behind the effort. One can only hope for a formula that will allow both sides to get what they want, even if right now both parties appear to be perched on a precarious ledge.
