The government deserves praise for its decision to bring home Gilad Shalit. Before complex military operations, each Israel Defense Forces fighter fears he may be captured by the enemy. Despite this fear, during the operation he focuses all of his attention on carrying out his duty. He believes and knows that if he falls into captivity, the people of Israel and their government will do everything they can to bring him home alive as soon as possible. This belief has become one of the pillars of our heroism and of the elite performance of all of our fighters. There are extreme situations in which government ministers, and especially their leader, should and must say: "We are strong enough to be weak." The courage to recognize this is a source of strength and determination when we are faced with tough decisions in times of trouble. I recently had a touching heart-to-heart with graduates of the IDF pilots course that Ron Arad completed before he fell into captivity. After the 1956 Sinai War, I flew for a year on a French air force squadron whose pilots fought in the Algerian War. After the 1967 Six-Day War and the subsequent War of Attrition, I completed a commander's course with the U.S. Marines whose other participants were alumni from the Vietnam War. Our conversations were open, honest and with almost no reservations. I left the course feeling tall and proud that I was a part of the special, unique Israeli people. Our mutual concern, the companionship, the daring, the resourcefulness, the allegiance to the mission and the sacrifice of our commanders and fighters, marks the uncompromising guarantee and seal of safety for our existence during real times of trouble. Just as the IDF's deterrence power protects the state of Israel, so does it protect our soldiers who have been taken hostage and kidnapped. Only the preservation of real deterrence power in the face of this sensitive issue will prevent future abductions. Our deterrence ability is contingent upon our commitment to making decisions and implementing them wisely. Our various security forces have the ability to perform almost any complex and logical task assigned them, like the operation in 1972 by an elite commando unit to take five Syrian officers to Israel, which prompted an immediate prisoner swap with the Syrians for the release of three Israeli pilots, and if the situation calls for it, we can do this again. It is also important to remember arrogant Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah's declaration that if he had known the results of the Second Lebanon War ahead of time he would not have dared provoke it. Indeed, the only reason he has not left his bunker in the last four years is because during the first 34 minutes of the Second Lebanon War, the Israel Air Force struck -- and destroyed in a direct hit -- 19 structures belonging to Hezbollah headquarter's in the Dahiya quarter in the Lebanese capital. The deal is justified under existing conditions. I had the privilege of separately commanding two air force fighter squadrons and a base during the Six-Day War, the Yom Kippur War, and the two wars of attrition that took place subsequent to them, a task that forced me to become familiar with bereavement, which is the most complex and sensitive issue I have ever known. To this day, I am connected to, and I help, bereaved families whose sons have fallen under my command. There is no greater tragedy in the world than losing a son or daughter at the height of their lives and it is no wonder their families' worlds are destroyed. Therefore, we are commanded to listen to their claims, be attentive to their expectations, understand their requests, and to warmly embrace them. On the other hand, when we understood that we would not get a better deal than the one we currently have, it was a brave decision to return one of our captured fighters and not to abandon him. At the same time, we hope that the prime minister will uphold his credo: any released Palestinian prisoner who returns to terrorism will be taking his life into his own hands. The Shalit deal was justified under existing conditions. The alternative would be to abandon and lose an IDF fighter, as unfortunately happened with Ron Arad, which is something that could shake the confidence and hidden pact that exists between the people of Israel and their government, and IDF fighters on the battlefields in generations to come. However, only brave decision making, based on past lessons, can lead to real and credible deterrence against future kidnappings. It is likely that we will once again need to face difficult times regarding kidnappings in the future, with the explicit knowledge that failure may be critical. Therefore, the senior decision-making system - which includes the prime minister, the relevant ministers, and senior defense establishment officials involved in the issue of soldier abductions - must practice, without live ammunition, exact simulations of soldier kidnappings, including all the decision-making processes and dilemmas that this may entail, so as not to fail in case of a real abduction, which could occur at any moment and without warning. The writer is a Brigadier General in the IDF reserves.
