In his piece "Without Dennis: Has over-identification harmed chances for peace-" (Israel Hayom Hebrew edition, Nov. 18), Yossi Beilin does the talented and accomplished American official Dennis Ross an injustice. Ross is indeed a Jew who is concerned about the future of the Jewish people. This is a part of his identity, and he is proud of that. However, Ross is first of all an American patriot. I have worked with him during negotiations both with the Palestinians and with the Syrians. In all of our many conversations, including the most intimate, Ross never crossed the line from representing U.S. interests to representing those of Israel. These interests often overlap, as befits two allies that share values and interests, but they also often diverge. Get the Israel Hayom newsletter sent to your mailbox! Ross is far from being a "pious fool" for Israel. He has not spared us his criticism (including in his monumental book "The Missing Peace"), and has invested much in an effort to toe the American line in Israel. That he represented U.S. commitments to Israel while being empathetic toward its unique challenges, intimately familiar with its secrets and generally pleasant does not mean he "blurred the lines" that separate us. How should this line be expressed exactly? With sanctions, when there is no agreement? Ross is one of the most creative and talented people I have ever met. He searches tirelessly for answers, unlike those who pile problems on potential solutions. He is capable of seeing things from his interlocutor's perspective and not just vis-a-vis Israelis to understand it in depth and create solutions based on this understanding. Did a series of presidents choose to work with him because of his "over-identification" with Israel, or could it have been out of recognition for his vast knowledge and talent, for the benefit of U.S. interests- It is easy to shoot the messenger, but it is not fair. Any American envoy, talented as he or she may be, is dependent on the sides he must mediate between, on the American leadership and on the circumstances of the day, including the U.S.' standing at the time. When the right combination of leadership and circumstances allowed for an agreement, along with support from an American leadership with a strong regional standing, no one took advantage of it to advance agreements like Ross. According to Beilin, Ross would have obstructed the first Camp David summit in 1978 like he did the second in 2000. This criticism is undeserved. Is Ross accountable for the failure of Ehud Barak and Yasser Arafat to achieve peace at Camp David? Is he to blame for the differences and lack of trust between Benjamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas? An U.S. envoy cannot want an agreement more than the sides themselves. With all of Ross' influence, he is not the U.S. president. He did not come up with the idea, for example, to launch Barack Obama's peace initiative with the unrealistic demand that Israel freeze construction in Judea and Samaria "to the last brick." This policy lacked "over-identification" with Israel, but it also failed. Even Abbas said the policy drove him into a corner and contributed to the failure of peacemaking efforts. If the U.S.' position as a broker in our region was harmed, it is unrealistic to blame this on Ross. Putting aside the fact that Ross was not primarily responsible for promoting peace in the Obama administration, what about the effects of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the economic crisis, the changes in the global balance of power, the Arab awakening is he to blame for all of this? One can criticize Ross for his style and stances; no man is immune to criticism. But in an age of upheavals, Ross' departure is a loss for Israel because it is a loss for the U.S. and for no other reason. The writer, a brigadier general in the reserves, is a research fellow at the Washington Institute for Middle East Policy and a former head of the IDF's Strategic Planning Division. He was involved in Israel's negotiations with its neighbors from 1993-2010.
Beilin portrays Ross as a man whose pro-Israel leanings superseded U.S. interests to the point that they obstructed the Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Beilin blames him for the failure to promote peace, even going so far as to say that, "If anyone is personally responsible for the fact that the U.S. has to a great extent lost its standing as a broker in our region it's Ross."
Beilin addresses his failures, but forgets to mention successes that Ross took an active role in securing, which go well beyond peace talks. In more than a few cases that did not receive media coverage, he helped prevent an escalation or calmed a crisis.
