"Your Majesty, now what-" Prime Minister Golda Meir asked.
King Hussein of Jordan replied, "We would like to maintain stability in this part of the world, ma'am." This conversation took place in 1973 during a covert meeting held somewhere in the Arava Valley on the Israel-Jordan border. The leaders of both countries were constantly in touch back then, but only recently was this made public.
The very fact that the such talks were held made both sides feel increasingly optimistic about the prospect of overcoming the differences between the two nations. The talks inspired hope among both sides that this process would one day culminate with both leaders appreciating their counterpart's efforts to do their utmost for their people. The talks were what made the "relative calm" -- a de facto peace -- possible. The fact that the two countries did not engage in hostilities since the 1967 Six-Day War was a testament to that reality.
After that war, the two sides were at odds over the future status of Judea and Samaria, as well as on Jerusalem. In fact, this is why the talks were initiated in the first place. Meir and Hussein held most of their talks in the Arava. The king would fly his private helicopter to the meetings, bringing his prime minister, Zaid al-Rifai, with him. Talks would usually center on the operation of the border crossings and cooperation on other issues. But a particularly interesting meeting took place on Sept. 25, 1973 -- about two weeks before the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War. The venue: an intelligence facility in central Israel.
Because the meeting was hastily arranged and held well inside Israel, it was considered an extraordinary encounter. Hussein was the one who asked for the meeting. He wanted to sound the alarm about the looming danger on Israel's borders. The Syrians and Egyptians were planning an attack on Israel, he warned. Their decision stemmed from the unraveling of the Rogers Plan, a desire to undo Israel's hubris and a need to compensate for their humiliating defeat in the Six-Day War. Hussein said Egypt and Syria wanted to reclaim the territory they had lost six years earlier.
Hussein confided with Meir that two weeks prior to the meeting he had met with Syrian President Hafez Assad and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. They told him that they were running out of patience and that they would like to initiate a flare-up with Israel on two fronts. Assad and Sadat asked Hussein if he would be willing to open a third, eastern front, but he refused.
Hussein told Meir about Syria's preparations and the military maneuvers it was planning. He also shared information on the deployment of its armored units and the locations of its aircraft. He expressed concern how things might unfold and inquired whether Israel was duly prepared. Meir said she would look into the matter. Hussein also said that he had promised Syria that he would send two armored brigades to the frontline to show Arab solidarity.
The details that emerged from those meetings were shared among American, Israeli and Jordanian policymakers, with both Israel and Jordan updating the Americans about the events leading up to the meetings and their aftermath, as well as on what transpired behind closed doors. The conversation that was held just prior to the war did not frighten Meir, but she couldn't stop thinking about what she had been told.
Dr. Orit Miller-Katav is a faculty member at the Menachem Begin Institute for the Study of Underground and Resistance Movements at Bar-Ilan University.
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