The perpetual Middle East rivalry | ישראל היום

The perpetual Middle East rivalry

News that Iran's and Turkey's governments reached an accord on Idlib, a Syrian town now the ‎focus of American interests, brings relations between two of the largest and most influential ‎states in the Middle East momentarily out of the shadows.‎

Their rivalry goes back a half-millennium, included eleven wars, and now remains, in the words ‎of the Washington Institute's Soner Cagaptay, the region's "oldest power game." What does the ‎recent accord signify and how will their competition influence the region's future-‎

Iranian and Turkish parallels are noteworthy. Both countries have populations of 80 million. ‎‎(Egypt, the region's third large country, has 96 million.) Both boast ancient civilizations, long ‎imperial histories, tensions with Russia, and a successful avoidance of European colonialism. In ‎modern times, each came under the rule of a ruthless modernizer after World War I, followed ‎more recently by an even more repressive Islamist.‎

The current leaders, Iran's Ali Khamenei and Turkey's Recep Tayyip Erdogan, enjoy near-‎absolute power and both feverishly try to hide this reality under a large and noisy apparatus of ‎elections, parliaments, cabinets, laws, and nongovernmental organizations. Both aspire to lead the entire Muslim ‎community, perhaps someday claiming to be caliph. In an era of muted anti-Zionism from Arab ‎states, Tehran and Ankara now lead the charge, with the Islamic Republic of Iran loudly denying ‎the Holocaust and the Republic of Turkey comparing Israelis to Nazis.‎

In several ways, Iranians lead Turks, but the latter are catching up. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini came to ‎power in 1979 and Erdogan in 2002. Iran has long enjoyed massive oil and gas reserves but ‎Turkey recently built an impressive economic base. Tehran deploys forces abroad, dominating ‎four Arab capitals, while Ankara still fights domestic opponents, especially Gulenists and Kurds. ‎Both governments despise the West but Iran is openly hostile while Turkey formally remains ‎in NATO and ostensibly seeks European Union membership.‎

Khamenei's thugs capture American sailors on the high seas while Erdogan's take residents ‎hostage. Conspiracy theories, long an Iranian art form, have made huge strides over the past two ‎decades in Turkey, which may now boast the region's most fantastical speculations. Both became ‎enthusiastic allies of Venezuela's dictator, Nicolas Maduro. As head of a longer-established ‎dictatorship, Khamenei can allow relative freedom of expression compared with Erdogan's ‎obsessive desire to control, including what basketball players in the United States say or what ‎travelers transiting through Istanbul airport think.‎

Their most major difference concerns the attitudes of their subjects. Whereas Khamenei enjoys ‎the support of only about 15% of the populace, Erdogan can count on some 45%, ‎affording Erdogan a legitimacy and confidence that Khamenei can only dream of. In part, this ‎results from longevity under Islamist rule, in part from difference in per capita income, which is ‎only $4,700 and stagnant in Iran, but $10,700 and rising in Turkey.‎

Regime collapse in Iran is within sight and will diminish Islamism, encouraging Muslims to move ‎toward a more modern and moderate form of their religion. The Turkish government's greater ‎popularity and more advanced version of Islamism gives it greater staying power that makes it ‎the more worrisome long-term opponent. Thus, the Middle East is likely to witness a grand ‎switch, with Iran on course to moderation and Turkey becoming the region's supreme danger.‎

Bilateral relations flourished during the first years of Erdogan's rule (2002-2010), when they shared ‎an Islamist worldview and a suspicion of U.S. intentions in Iraq. But relations then soured, ‎primarily because both regimes seek foreign influence and, as neighbors, they inevitably clash. ‎The civil war in Syria, where Tehran backs Shiite-oriented jihadis and Ankara backs Sunni ‎jihadis, is their biggest but not only problem. Other matters also aggravate relations, such as their ‎supporting opposing sides in Yemen, Turkish installation of a NATO radar tracking Iranian ‎activities, and Iranian support for al-Qaida against Turkey.‎

Tensions have reached the point that Ali Vaez of the International Crisis Group finds Tehran and ‎Ankara "on a collision course." Left unchecked, he expects the present dynamics to point ‎‎"toward greater bloodshed, growing instability and greater risks of direct ... military ‎confrontation." More poetically, Cagaptay observes that the Middle East has room for "one shah ‎or sultan, but not a shah and a sultan."‎

In this context, the Idlib accord looks flimsy and transient. Tehran and Ankara will probably ‎soon turn against each other and with renewed vigor continue their perpetual rivalry.‎

Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org, @DanielPipes) is president of the Middle East Forum.

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