On the eve of Shavuot in 1981, Israeli jets bombed the Osirak nuclear reactor near Baghdad, built by then-Iraqi President Saddam Hussein with French assistance. The reactor was destroyed, thus ending the Iraqi dictator's dream of acquiring a nuclear weapon. Saddam's willingness to use chemical weapons during the Iran-Iraq War, along with his reputation as a murderous and unbridled tyrant, which was proved by is invasion of Kuwait in the summer of 1990, bolstered the claim that he would have used nuclear weapons against his enemies, including Israel, if the option was at his disposal. Regardless of any assessment, however, it is also clear that acquiring nuclear weapons would have granted Saddam immunity from an American attack, the likes of which led to his downfall in the spring of 2003. The attack on the Osirak reactor 35 years ago sparked heated internal debate, and some opposition members at the time were quick to criticize then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin for deciding to attack inside Iraq. But all of that paled in comparison to the external criticism voiced by countries worldwide, among them the United States, which even placed an temporary embargo on arms shipments to Israel. The world argued that by eliminating the nuclear reactor sought by Saddam, Israel had dealt a blow to the chances of advancing peace in the region. According to the prominent New York Times, which has always tended toward automatic criticism of Israel, bombing Osirak was an act of unjustified violence. In light of the chilly and even hostile global reaction toward the Israeli attack, we can conclude that the passing years not only strengthened and confirmed the justification and morality of the Israeli operation, but also its inherent diplomatic and military logic. It became apparent that Israel's determination to prevent its enemies from acquiring nuclear weapons helped stave off a regional nuclear arms race as early as the previous century. We also learned that the international community is at best helpless when confronting the threats to regional stability, and at worst is often complicit in helping these threats develop -- as evidenced by the cooperation Saddam received from several countries. Today we see similar cooperation with Iran, which is trying to succeed where Saddam failed by getting its hands on the bomb. Beyond all this, it is important to emphasize that in contrast to the commonly accepted assessments at the time, Saddam did not retaliate against Israel for the Osirak attack. He would eventually claim that he launched missiles at Israel during the Gulf War as a type of delayed revenge, but it was clear he would have fired those missiles regardless, even if Israel had never destroyed his nuclear reactor. This is because he wanted to drag Israel into the war and thus garner the Arab world's support. To be certain, the Israeli attack did not spark a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. It actually curbed it for almost two decades. It also didn't exacerbate regional tensions or ignite a regional conflagration. The Iranian decision to develop a nuclear weapon was in no small part motivated by Saddam's exploitation of widespread Arab and international support, his use of missiles and primarily his use of chemical weapons against its soldiers and civilians. Meanwhile, Moammar Gadhafi's efforts in Libya and then Bashar Assad's efforts in Syria to acquire nuclear weapons were primarily influenced by North Korea's ability to establish deterrence and even immunity against a possible American threat, due to the nuclear weapons it had developed. Indeed, the lessons of the past teach us that we should treat any military action as a necessary evil, the results of which should be examined with a level head and common sense. There is a great distance, however, between those lessons and the weakness and paralysis that seize the international community every time a threat like Saddam's nuclear reactor pops up. We must assess such threats through Israeli eyes and according to Israel's interests, as Begin did in 1981 on the eve of Shavuot.
35 years since Osirak
פרופ' אייל זיסר
פרופ' אייל זיסר הוא מומחה למזה"ת ואפריקה וסגן הרקטור באוניברסיטת תל אביב
