Mahmoud Abbas' petition to the United Nations to acknowledge a Palestinian state within the pre-1967 borders stands on two pillars. Since turning his back on Ehud Olmert, who offered him a generous proposal to establish two states for two nations, Abbas has shown the world that he cannot and/or does not want to reach the solution he swears he intends to reach. Also, he is worried that in negotiations with Benjamin Netanyahu, he will not be granted the favorable conditions that the previous prime minister offered. Israel's demand for Palestinian recognition of the state's Jewish character is understandable and justified, but is also a burden on reopening negotiations. The Palestinians' refusal to recognize the Jewish people is an attempt to loosen our grip on our right to have an independent state in the future. This is the same fundamental debate from the days of Woodrow Wilson about the right to define self-determination. Accordingly there is some logic to Israel's position on it's claim, but there is a heavy price that comes with that logic, as Israel's friends see a hidden agenda by Netanyahu to preserve the current situation for many years to come. The Palestinian Authority was the one that has refused to renew negotiations. The Israeli government, however, did not necessarily display enough flexibility to its friends around the world to convince them that the responsibility for the paralysis of negotiations lies with PA leaders in Ramallah. Abbas found it difficult to enter negotiations following that earthquake called the "Arab Spring," while Hosni Mubarak, Moammar Gadhafi and Bashar Assad were free to act as they pleased. Now he has even more difficulties, and the pressure exerted by the extremists has increased, as indicated by the recent influx of Palestinian terrorists into Judea and Samaria. The mass arrest of Hamas terrorists intending to carry out attacks in Jerusalem displays the weakness of the Palestinian Authority, and its utter lack of ability to thwart plots without security cooperation from the Israel Defense Forces and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet). The United States tried, and failed, to prevent the Palestinians' petition to the U.N. The U.S. clarified that it will veto the petition in the Security Council. This is important but it still does not completely solve the problem. Abbas is behaving not only as someone who prefers a diplomatic-political confrontation, but also as someone intending to entangle Israel at The International Court of Justice in the Hague; his petition to the General Assembly is the lesser evil in Palestinian terms. Naturally, more aggressive Israeli responses have surfaced. They flew out to the media too early. Israel has no option to block the funding it collects for the Palestinians without quarrelling with most of its friends in the West; any other potential moves require careful, cautious thinking as well. At this stage, it seems preferable to concentrate Israel's diplomatic efforts on improving the text of our proposal before the Palestinians bring their petition to the General Assembly. Erase the 1967 borders; blur the wording about the future of Jerusalem; recruit friends in Europe to this task - even Israel's U.N. Ambassador Ron Prosor is of the opinion that Israel will come out of the U.N. battle defeated. There is room for improvement before we jump to any contrarian decisions, to the chagrin of Israel's friends around the world.
