Too little, too late

Following Russia's de facto takeover of Crimea after the peninsula's referendum at the weekend -- some 97 percent voted in favor of annexation to Russia -- the West can take consolation in one thing: The U.S., still the top global superpower, has returned to taking an interest in Europe. American F-16 fighter jets have landed in Poland. U.S. Vice President Joe Biden is expected to follow in the coming days, with a scheduled stop in Lithuania as well.

Even though U.S. President Barack Obama spoke s in his State of the Union address about his administration's different and evolving priorities, with an inclination toward Asia and the Pacific Rim, the world's agenda is apparently not determined in Washington, and Obama needs to adjust himself to the world.

Obama on Monday imposed sanctions on seven senior Russian government officials, including the deputy prime minister, while the EU leveled sanctions against the 21 senior Russian and Ukrainian government officials responsible, from its perspective, for quickly escalating the situation in Crimea. This is too late and too little. The Russian bear has already swallowed the peninsula as if it were a jar of honey. It can take all the time in the world to digest it. Now that Crimea de facto belongs to Russia, there is not much point in rushing to receive de jure recognition. The international community will not grant this (Russia is the only country that recognizes the referendum), but it is also not capable of taking Crimea back.

The West can flex its muscles in front of Russia: On March 21, during the scheduled European Council summit, the heads of the 28 EU member states can decide to add Ukraine to the Association Agreement (which creates a framework for non-EU countries to cooperate with the EU), as per the desire of the protesters in Kiev's Independence Square. This is certainly an option, especially if the Russian parliament ratifies the referendum results on Friday. The Europeans, though, are not rushing to take this step.

Firstly, because they themselves are divided over the extent to which sanctions against Russia can be intensified (varying interests), and primarily because several EU states are dependent on Russian gas. Putin has taken over Crimea and the Russian gas giant Gazprom took over Europe a long time ago. It's a problem.

The Ukrainian story is multifaceted and complicated. The most serious aspect is not only NATO's admission to having no contingency plan for a Russian invasion of Crimea, but that it never had a diplomatic plan either.

It is one thing for the military option to no longer be fashionable (as in Syria and Iran), but the diplomatic stammering is also raising concerns.

Putin, suffice it to say, will exploit the West's blubbering and Washington's lack of leadership. He will also remind us that many in the West recognized the referendum in Kosovo on Feb. 17, 2008, which called for its independence from Serbia (although Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Romania and Slovakia refused recognition), but not the one in Crimea. Why not indeed?

The West probably also understands the underlying dangers in the popular revolutions of today. As in Egypt, Ukraine and Libya, the West displays considerable exuberance at first. We know what comes next.

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