Be bright, not just mighty

The State Comptroller recently issued a report harshly criticizing the government's decision-making process leading up to the Turkish flotilla incident (in which Israeli navy commandos clashed with Turkish activists aboard a ship headed for Gaza, killing nine people). Criticism against the military's decision-making process in the lead up to the same incident was detailed in a separate report — penned by Maj. Gen. (res.) Giora Eiland, but its conclusions were not made public because the report contained classified information.

The details of Eiland's report are very important, and the Israel Defense Forces should learn a lesson from every clause in this report. But beyond the details, the IDF needs to re-examine its general approach to operational problems it is faced with, and how it formulates and presents ideas to the government.

The army's tendency is to rely on its brute force and its ability to win battles with physical power alone. The modern battlefield presents complex situations that require the army to think, analyze and understand concepts beyond the purely physical.

"Adhere to the mission and strive for victory" — this is the value that the IDF instills in its soldiers and commanders. Therefore, when the mission was defined as preventing the Turkish ships from breaching Israel's naval blockade on Gaza, every last soldier and commander in the operational units focused on the tactical aspect of the mission. Commandos were selected from the most elite units; the best helicopters were deployed flown by the best pilots. The navy's commander, who oversaw the mission, decided to forgo his position in the well-equipped navy control center in favor of a small vessel, close to the operation, in accordance with the golden tactical rule: commanders at the front.

On the opposing side, the flotilla organizers' mission was simple and clear. It wasn't to carry critical, life-saving humanitarian aid to the sick and oppressed people of Gaza, it was to undermine Israel's legitimacy by presenting Israelis as using illegitimate means to impose a siege on a civilian population. The flotilla's mission was to gain as much media attention as possible, portraying Israel and its army as brutal people who trample on basic values of human rights.

We all know what the outcome was. Within the IDF, and within Israel, the commandos who took part in the operation were commended for their bravery, and rightfully so. Despite the malicious intentions of the flotilla activists, the IDF successfully prevented any ship from docking in Gaza, and proved that the activists were not on any humanitarian mission. But in the international media, the IDF was depicted as a violent aggressive army that uses excessive force. The world consequently doled out harsh criticism over the Israeli operation and the Gaza blockade.

Israel became a contemptible nation and the subject of many protests on campuses around the world. Our relations with Turkey — formerly a strategic ally — reached rock bottom. When Israel was founded, its image revolved around the Exodus — a ship that brought refugees from Europe's death camps to safe shores — but now Israel's image revolves around the Mavi Marmara — a pseudo-peace ship that Israel attacked.

At the end of the day, the IDF completed its mission, but the flotilla organizers achieved their goal too. So who won the battle?

The IDF, the strongest army in the Middle East, should also strive to be the smartest army in the Middle East, because that is our only relative advantage.

Asaf Agmon heads the Fisher Institute for Air and Space Strategic Studies.