Mind the gaps

The agreement between Iran and the West has two sides. On one side, if followed through in full, it will have largely frozen the most crucial parts of the Iranian nuclear program. Another two key points are Iran's willingness to sign off on an intrusive inspection mechanism and the powers' insistence that sanctions relief expire after six months unless another agreement is struck. The West also said that the sanctions remaining in place would have to be vigorously enforced throughout negotiations.

On the other side, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is right when he says that if the U.S. and Iran fail to strike an agreement after six months, they would prefer to stop short of declaring the talks a failure; rather, they would extend the interim agreement until it becomes the de facto permanent deal. The current agreement, despite its positive aspects, will not scale back Iran's capability to manufacture nuclear weapons in any meaningful way -- a provision that must be incorporated into any permanent agreement as far as Israel is concerned.

The agreement contains four key shortcomings: it lets Iran off the hook when it comes to complying with U.N. Security Council resolutions that mandate a complete dismantling of its nuclear-related infrastructure; Iran does not have to address some unanswered questions on the military aspects of its nuclear program and their scope, even though the International Atomic Energy Agency has demanded it do so; and finally, it allows the continued enrichment of uranium up to a level of 3.5 percent purity -- a tacit, de facto, acknowledgement that it has the right to enrich uranium, as it has long insisted.

The agreement also lacks an effective mechanism to ensure that no clandestine site goes undetected. The agreement runs the risk that Iran will operate such sites to further its nuclear program, with the West being unable to monitor the activities that go on there. Iran has tried to hide such activities before.

As negotiations over a permanent deal get underway, we should now stop debating who is right; it's time to restore the confidence between Washington and Jerusalem and to make sure each sides' moves are once again closely coordinated.

President Barack Obama has recently reiterated his position that he was committed to Israel's security and that he would prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons. The Israeli leadership must iron out its differences with Washington behind closed doors, as this is the only way to find an agreed framework for a permanent deal. Only through cooperation and close coordination would Israel and the U.S. be able to accept a Plan B -- which would go into effect if Iran breaches the agreement or if the parties fail to reach an agreement after six months of negotiations.

This plan would have to ratchet up sanctions and make the military option more credible and more threatening.

Israeli intelligence agencies must work together with their American counterparts to address the shortcomings of the interim deal so that Iranian violations or progress on the military aspect of its nuclear program do not go undetected (including in secret sites). Only by joining forces would Israel and the U.S. be able to deal with the outstanding issues that have been left unaddressed by diplomacy; this is the only way to leverage the good parts of the interim deal ahead of the permanent agreement on Iran's nuclear program.

Avner Golov is a researcher at the The Institute for National Security Studies at Tel-Aviv University