A Harpaz Truce

Let me make a prediction: Maj. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot's appointment as deputy chief of the general staff will be greenlighted by Attorney-General Yehuda Weinstein. While Weinstein has properly instructed the political echelons not to announce high-level appointments in the run-up to the elections, there are ways to go around that directive. The appointment of Eizenkot is one case where a waiver should be granted, because this staffing decision has won unanimous consent and virtually no opposition.

Support for Eizenkot's appointment is widespread, but what's even more impressive is that both camps in the Harpaz Affair have endorsed the move. This whole story about how former Chief of the General Staff Gabi Ashkenazi tried to meddle in the affairs of his superior, Defense Minister Ehud Barak, seems to be behind us, although the state comptroller's report on the matter has not been published yet.

By mishandling the investigation of the so-called Harpaz Document, law enforcement committed the original sin that led to this legal mess. [The document initially suggested Barak was waging a campaign to appoint Ashkenazi's rival, then Southern Command GOC Yoav Galant, as the next chief of the general staff, but as it turned out, that document was apparently forged by an ally of Ashkenazi, Boaz Harpaz, in an effort to tarnish Barak and Galant.] Had Weinstein instructed the police to conduct a thorough investigation into the libelous claim that Galant had authored the document, when it first came out back in 2010, this affair would have survived only in the storage rooms in the national archives.

But the attorney-general and the police's behavior made it seem like all they wanted to do was to steer clear of the particulars of the case and have it shut in a hurry, despite respected journalists such as Aluf Benn and Ari Shavit having said Harpaz's efforts amounted to a "putsch" and a "colonel mutiny."

The investigation deviated from the norm on all levels; Weinstein and then-State Comptroller Micha Lindenstrauss played a major role in denying Galant the position of chief of the general staff (after his appointment had already been approved by the government because he allegedly had his private property extended to include state property without authorization). The circumstances surrounding Galant's departure complicated the resolution of this affair. If the case was behind us, Eizenkot's appointment could have been made a year ago, or even earlier, but the affair just wouldn't go away and Barak clearly had to put things on hold.

Eizenkot, as reported on numerous occasions, got word of the Harpaz Document from Ashkenazi's bureau and he decided to show it to Tamir Pardo (who went on to become the Mossad chief) and Dr. Gabi Siboni. And although Eizenkot conducted himself properly by telling them not to leak its contents to the media, there is still a lingering question of why, when the police summoned him for an investigation, he did not tell the investigators that he was privy to the document. That said, on the whole, Eizenkot did the right thing by advising Ashkenazi to go to his superiors or to law enforcement officials and show them the corrupting document. This would have been the right course of action. But Ashkenazi did not heed his advice.

But all's wells that ends well. Eizenkot is a senior officer; Barak has tremendous respect for him. Eizenkot was Barak's military secretary when the latter was prime minister. Barak wanted to put off a decision on the next deputy chief of the general staff until law enforcement officials concluded the investigation. But they were dithering and were nowhere to be seen. Weinstein has also failed to launch a criminal investigation into the affair despite being urged to do so by the state comptroller and IDF military advocate-general.

As a result, Eizenkot's appointment was in limbo for many months. Chief of the General Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz also wanted to see him appointed, but to no avail. That is why Eizenkot's appointment should be cleared even though the elections are in full swing. Even more important is that Eizenkot's appointment was made on professional grounds. We would be ill-served by looking at it through a political prism. If Barak is in favor of the appointment, all others involved must have given their consent as well. This may very well be the only instance where Barak, Gantz, Ashkenazi and the presumptive minister of defense from Likud, Strategic Affairs Minister Moshe (Bogie) Ya'alon, are all in agreement.

This is a done deal, so why turn it into such a laborious undertaking-