Hamas left Israel's government no choice but to order the Israel Defense Forces to start a land incursion. Hamas refused to accept Israel's government offer of "quiet for quiet," rejected the Egyptian cease-fire proposal and violated the humanitarian pause initiated by the U.N. It continuously fired over 10 days more than 1500 missiles toward towns and cities of Israel, hoping to kill as many civilians as possible. The goal continues to be the establishment of a reality in which Israeli residents can live in safety without continuous indiscriminate terror, while striking a significant blow to Hamas' terror infrastructure. The Israeli government wisely adopted limited political and military goals in accordance with the "mowing the grass" strategy. Israel's strategy in the 21st century against hostile nonstate groups such as Hamas reflects the assumption that Israel finds itself in a protracted intractable conflict. The use of force in such a conflict is not intended to attain impossible political goals, but a strategy of attrition designed primarily to debilitate the enemy capabilities. Only after showing much restraint in its military responses does Israel act forcefully to destroy as much as possible the capabilities of its foes, hoping that occasional large-scale operations also have a temporary deterrent effect in order to create periods of quiet along Israel's borders. As the ground phase of Operation Protective Edge progresses, we must be realistic about what can be achieved. Destroying the terror tunnels along the fence around the Gaza Strip is an attainable military goal. In the process, terrorists can be killed and a part of the terrorist infrastructure demolished. The Israeli ground advance might create unrest within the Hamas organization causing some of its military leadership to move around and make mistakes that could result in better intelligence and targeted killings from air. An expansion of the ground operation might exact an even higher price from Hamas. Continuous shelling of Israel by Hamas may inevitably lead to Israel's conquest of all of Gaza. Yet, the strategic calculus should always focus on cost-effectiveness. Despite calls from the Right in Israel, the demise of Hamas rule is not a military objective because it is unattainable. Hamas is a well-rooted organization in Palestinian society, particularly in Gaza. A recent Pew poll shows 35 percent of the Palestinians view Hamas favorably, and in Gaza the level of support is always higher. Eradicating Hamas and subsequently the political engineering of Palestinian society is not something outsiders can do. Even if Hamas rule could be terminated, the alternatives are Israeli rule, the rule of more radical groups, or chaos. None are welcome options. Similarly, the calls from the Israeli Left to search for a political solution are totally unrealistic. Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and Salafist groups see Israel as a theological aberration and despite reluctant acceptance of temporary cease-fires, reject any diplomatic course of action intended to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The great commitment of these militias to a radical ideology and to a patient strategy of violent resistance (muqawama) turn the situation into an intractable conflict. As the rounds of violence with Hamas continue, the frustration with lack of clear military decision or with the absence of a peaceful resolution is understandable. Nevertheless, employing military force is useful in such limited small wars with no clear decision. While there is an erosion of deterrence after Israeli large-scale operations, Hamas needs to be punished for its aggressive behavior and reminded of the cost it must pay for continuing the violence against Israel. A period of quiet is achieved by destroying capabilities that are hard and expansive to rebuild. Buying time is a legitimate goal. Additionally, in the current strategic situation Hamas is isolated, making the rebuilding of its military assets a longer process. Moreover, we should not forget that other actors in the tough Middle East neighborhood are watching and they also need also a vivid reminder that aggression might be costly. Inaction is perceived as weakness. This harms deterrence and invites aggression. In this round, Israel's greatest achievement so far was proving to its neighbors that Israel's missile defense can parry the missile threats, allowing the homefront much normalcy. Those who question when this is going to end, often using the cliche of a "cycle of violence," have psychological difficulties digesting the fact that there is no solution in sight and, yes, the violent struggle against Hamas is not going to end as long as the basic motivations remain. But this does not mean that important periods of quiet are not attainable by military action. The Israeli approach is substantively different from the current Western strategic thinking on dealing with nonstate military challenges. Western thinking is solution-oriented. This explains part of the lack of understanding for what Israel is doing. Against an implacable well-entrenched nonstate enemy like Hamas, Israel simply needs to "mow the grass" once in a while in order to degrade enemy capabilities. A war of attrition against Hamas is probably Israel's fate for the long term. Keeping the enemy off balance and reducing its capabilities requires Israeli military readiness and a willingness to use force intermittently, while maintaining a healthy and resilient Israeli homefront despite the protracted conflict. Efraim Inbar is director of the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan University, and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. Eitan Shamir is research fellow at the Begin-Sadat Center and lecturer in political studies at Bar-Ilan University.
Mowing the grass in Gaza
מערכת ישראל היום
מערכת "ישראל היום“ מפיקה ומעדכנת תכנים חדשותיים, מבזקים ופרשנויות לאורך כל שעות היממה. התוכן נערך בקפדנות, נבדק עובדתית ומוגש לציבור מתוך האמונה שהקוראים ראויים לעיתונות טובה יותר - אמינה, אובייקטיבית ועניינית.
