The Israeli political arena is abuzz. As if from within a tunnel, everyone is hearing the pounding of hammers, pickaxes, bulldozers, and other heavy equipment, but their path remains unclear, and no one knows where the politicians currently maneuvering their way will choose to emerge into the world. Such twists and turns have happened in the past, when changes in Israel's relations with the United States or with Arab nations have affected internal politics, but now it seems that the issues are causing a new division within the coalition. If Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu presents the cabinet with a deal based on Jonathan Pollard's release alongside the release of Israeli Arab terrorists, he would be able to secure a majority vote in the government -- but not necessarily among Likud ministers. Habayit Hayehudi leader MK Naftali Bennett enjoys considerable support from the Likud faction, but Yisrael Beytenu leader Avigdor Lieberman has found himself standing closer to Hatnuah leader Tzipi Livni and Yesh Atid leader Yair Lapid, all of whom feel that former Likud minister Moshe Kahlon is waiting right around the corner. As the potential for an internal conflict within the coalition grows, many have begun saying that the next general elections are likely to take place in March 2015. But is that realistic? Netanyahu is fighting on two fronts, and he has one hand tied in each of them. The constraints he faces when dealing with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry or Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas are different from the ones he faces when dealing with Bennett or Livni. Netanyahu has several options to choose from, all of which could lead to one of two outcomes: blaming the Palestinians for the paralysis plaguing the peace talks -- providing that Housing and Construction Minister Uri Ariel (Habayit Hayehudi) does not blindside him with another tender for extensive construction in Judea and Samaria and Jerusalem -- or reaching a deal that would extend the peace talks until 2015. This is a complex situation that could include releasing Israeli Arab terrorists and another 400 Palestinian prisoners convicted of lesser offenses, as well as restraining construction in Judea and Samaria. Netanyahu could accept any of these terms, but if the Americans or the Palestinians assume he would agree to all of them at once, than they have very little understanding of the public sentiment in Israel. Abbas does not care, as he is not really interested in reaching an agreement. Kerry, however, cares a great deal, and if Netanyahu dares offer an actual concession, the next American "poof" will be directed at Ramallah. This would enable the coalition to survive the current tensions and two more Knesset sessions, as no one would have a reason to resign. But with two weeks left to the current round of Kerry-mediated peace talks, the Palestinian have violated the agreement by seeking international recognition, and Israel has prematurely imposed sanctions that should have been reserved for more dire situations. After all, if the financial sanctions prove effective and harm Abbas, Israel would be the first to bail him out. If Kerry is truly a mediator and an arbitrator and not just a messenger, he must find a way to get the situation under control and ensure both parties resume serious negotiations, followed by actual implementation, instead of being sidetracked. The current makeup of the Israeli government still stands a considerable, albeit diminishing, chance.
