The American working document, meant to serve as a bridgehead for a second season of negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, is one of the most palatable Israel has seen.
Its content does not, of course, meet everything the Israeli government wanted, but it does make an effort within the range of American policy since the Six-Day War.
Its advantage is that it binds only the U.S., not Israel. Its disadvantage is that it is not binding for the Palestinians, either. Jerusalem's eyes are on Washington, not Ramallah. But political turmoil in the region is unfolding.
The Americans are divided on whether Jonathan Pollard's release serves the right purpose. They put the word "game-changer" beside his name -- a turning point in the negotiations -- and in the White House they reasoned that it was not worth giving him up in exchange for a short-term renewal of talks. But U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry convinced U.S. President Barack Obama, and now there is a chance we might see him in Israel, reading the Passover Haggadah.
Claims by the right wing of the coalition that Pollard is not a fair trade for the release of terrorist murderers deserve consideration, but the truth is that even without him, the government would face the dilemma of whether or not to accept the terms for continuing talks. Having the blame for the negotiations' failure put on Israel would be a fatal blow in the international arena and would lead to international organizations recognizing the Palestinian Authority, wholesale, as if it were a sovereign state.
Adding Pollard's release to the equation soothes a deep Israeli pain. However, the need to make a decision would exist without him as well.
Breaking through the Oslo barrier
The crux of the decision that lies before the government -- which may be discussed as early as Wednesday, all while Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas threatens to destroy the bridge Kerry has built -- is clear: With Pollard or without him, is Israel prepared to accept some kind of limitation on construction in Judea and Samaria; to stop the tenders and the public construction, but continue with private contractors at all the building sites, not only in the settlement blocs-
With or without this type of agreement, the issue of the fourth stage of the prisoner release remains. The release would include murderers who are Israeli Arabs. It's a shame. Among bad options, it would have been better to break though "the Oslo barrier" -- that is to say, to release murderers who served time after the Oslo Accords and only those who are not Israeli. There is a negative significance to the fact that the Palestinian Authority is turning into the legitimate representative of Israeli citizens.
At the end of the day, the intense pressure that reigned Tuesday night was an accumulation of tactics in brinkmanship. Abbas is doing this to improve his terms, but he knows he won't get former Fatah Secretary-General Marwan Barghouti, even if he threatens a unilateral approach to the U.N.
It's the same with Israeli politics. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu explained to Likud ministers what the scope of the possible agreement was. He will have a majority in the government. Habayit Hayehudi ministers will oppose. So will some Likud ministers, but will they remain in the coalition afterwards? Despite the partial settlement freeze? And despite the release of terrorists? They are also playing with brinkmanship.
Deputy Defense Minister Danny Danon made a mistake and committed to resign if the release goes through, and he may be forced to stand by his words. The others, Transportation Minister Yisrael Katz, Deputy Foreign Minister Ze'ev Elkin, Deputy Minister Ofir Akunis and Deputy Transportation Minister Tzipi Hotovely, will find a reason to stay. Habayit Hayehudi will follow in their footsteps, but with one or two rebels along the way.
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