Those in the more moderate wings of the coalition who joined the government just to advance negotiations with the Palestinians used unparliamentary language to describe the radicalization and threatening words of the leadership in Ramallah. Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas and his colleagues met with high-ranking Israelis and warned that if talks reach an impasse, "We, the Palestinians, have a Plan B, and you, the Israelis, have nothing." Their Plan B is well known. They will get recognition as a Palestinian state in the U.N. and then they will go to the International Criminal Court in The Hague, and they will increase pressure to organize a boycott against Israel. Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, an operational head in the Palestinian leadership, outlined this plan in an extensively quoted interview with Time magazine. As someone who believes that the main principles in the American framework document are reasonable from an Israeli perspective, and that it is not a coincidence that they upset Abbas to the point where he threatened a collapse of the negotiations; and as someone who believes that Israel could have been flexible on some of its stances regarding settlement building -- I have no doubt that when it comes to the issue of the Palestinian boycott, Israel must respond strongly. In his speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu spoke about the new anti-Semitic essence of the boycott movement against the Jewish state. When it comes to concrete steps taken by the Palestinian leadership, the reaction should not only be verbal. In simple biblical Hebrew, "an eye for an eye" and a boycott for a boycott. The Palestinian economy is fueled by and benefits from Israel's improved economic situation. The whole concept of building a trusting relationship from "the bottom up," as Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon persistently maintains, is based on the assumption that Israel is willing and able to assist its neighboring nation. But it is inconceivable that it will invest its capital and its welfare in helping the Palestinians build their economy in Judea and Samaria and in increasing their trade with the world, while they are still talking about a boycott. Especially because the boycott's cause, as Ashrawi and her friends have outlined it, is unreasonable. It is inconceivable that Israel would undo the economic commitments it made to the Palestinians just because they are not prepared to recognize it as a Jewish state and are hindering the continuation of dialogue. Just as Israel does not have to agree to negotiations under terrorist fire, it does not have to commit to talks when the other half of the conversation is working toward its isolation and boycott. On the other hand, meanwhile, though it may be a minority opinion, it is clear to me that there is room for the government to build with restraint in the settlement blocs during negotiations for their future sovereignty. I met Ashrawi and Palestinian politician Yasser Abed Rabbo at a conference in Helsinki, Finland in the early '90s. Ashrawi was tougher and more aggressive than her colleagues, and those participating in the discussion explained that she has to demonstrate utmost loyalty to those who sent her since she is the only Christian and the only woman in a leadership made up of Muslim men. But she is sharp-tongued and articulate, and experience gained over the years has shown that she often foreshadows official Palestinian policies even before they take effect. It is worth preparing for them in advance.
