A brief timeline: Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared he would not uproot Jews from their homes in Judea and Samaria; the aggressive statement triggered harsh reactions in Europe (the Americans had no reason to get excited because they already knew it to begin with); the prime minister felt that he needed to mollify the Europeans, so he explained that what he meant was that the settlers would remain under Palestinian sovereignty.
Habayit Hayehudi Chairman Naftali Bennett and the right wing of Likud and Habayit Hayehudi reacted clamorously. That must have stung, snickered commentators Yaron London, Mordechai Kirschenbaum and Raviv Drucker on Monday. Mostly, they were delighted to suggest that Netanyahu had fallen into a trap, uncovering the reality of the situation: He never intended to execute that option, he simply wanted Abbas to reject the proposal while Israel washed its hands of it. According to Drucker, by admitting that, Netanyahu wrecked himself.
Adding to the discussion, London insisted that the Palestinians were the biggest winners. They could have said "sure," making the prime minister look as though he was merely promoting spin. But, alas, that never happened. Abbas roared an immediate "no" -- with plenty of exclamation marks. No Jew would be permitted to live on Palestinian territory.
Why didn't Abbas listen to the advice of the pundits on Israeli television? He's an experienced policy man. He knows not everything is black or white; not everything is either spin or serious policy proposal; negotiations conduct is more complex than that.
It goes like this: Netanyahu did indeed lay a trap for Abbas by proposing that isolated settlements could remain (without being forced) in demilitarized Palestine. The basic premise was that Abbas would demur -- which is what happened -- and in the eyes of the coalition, everything would be fine. But that plot was foiled.
But the statement from his office had another purpose: to send a trial balloon out, testing the merits of such a possibility. In other words, and if Abbas would have agreed to it at some point, would the concept have been a possibility among the Right and settlers in the coalition? Not just spin, but a test run as well.
It's worth recalling that Rabbi Menachem Fromen also preached that concept. Avi Farhan propagated it in Yamit and Gush Katif, and he still supports the idea of keeping Jewish towns in Palestine. Prolific left-wing thinker Dr. Yossi Beilin knows that solution is feasible, albeit far from fruition.
Whoever believes that the prime minister wanted to aggravate Abbas is seeing things correctly; whoever adds that he wanted to check reactions among the right wing, the Palestinians, the Americans and the Europeans, is also discerning.
Netanyahu was not wrong to inflate the diplomatic trial balloon. There is no "either -- or" in negotiations except in the final stage, just before signing off on the deal. Until then, all options remain open and nothing is off the table. Even his reactions to the Right varied. But it appears he hit the nail on the head sending a message to Likud ministers that the door remains wide open for anyone who is discontent enough to quit, here and now.
In one way or another, the advantage outperformed the damage, exemplified in the following narrow understanding: Every capital in the world now realizes Netanyahu is seriously considering the idea of keeping some settlements in Palestine.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו