Escaping the diplomatic Catch-22

The Institute for National Security Studies will hold its annual conference next week. This prestigious gathering will be attended by high-ranking officials and security policy experts from around the world. Some of the speakers also include those whose philosophies barely hold water, and who serve as little more than a dressing for national soul searching.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process, the deadline of which is looming, will be the conference's main focus and everyone will be seeking ideas that are "outside the box." Here are a few suggestions:

• The negotiations will come to a close in April. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry has used Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to try and convince Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas to extend them by one year.

Israel has been supportive of this move so far, but it is best if it remains on the sidelines. An extension would be warranted only if the Palestinian and the Israelis demonstrate some flexibility by, for example, having Netanyahu outline the borders and Abbas recognize Israel as the Jewish state.

• Assuming the negotiations fail and the world uses the construction in Judea and Samaria to blame Israel for the failure -- it would be in Netanyahu's best interest to pursue the peace talks to avoid dangerous moves by the international community, which might pursue boycotts more vigorously; and the Palestinians, who might pursue full membership in the U.N.

Another element of pressure was added on Thursday, when the German government announced that Israeli high-tech companies based beyond the Green Line would not be eligible for funding. The international boycott is a significant strategic failure.

• The alternative to such a scenario is to promote multiple and parallel negotiation paths, involving Israel, the U.S. and the EU, and the Arab League -- should it be so inclined. The only prerequisite would be a U.S. and EU pledge that whatever Israel agrees to would not be open to further changes when the Palestinians finally decide to join the talks.

The group of countries that would represent the world in these talks would be formed at the discretion of the U.S. and the EU and the Arab League.

• The agreement, which would be presented for U.N. approval, would see Israel withdraw to the security fence, according to an outline that would include all main settlement blocs. Other areas would be earmarked for annexation, with the understanding that in the future, should a permanent peace deal be stuck, the Palestinians would be compensated with an identical land swap.

The Israel Defense Forces will maintain its presence in the Jordan Valley in conjunction with Jordanian troops and an international force.

• As for the Palestinian Authority's status in Judea and Samaria, between the settlement blocs and the Jordan River, the majority of the territory given to it will be determined through negotiations between the PA and the Arab League, as long as they refrain from asserting full sovereignty and the area is demilitarized.

Israeli communities located beyond the main settlement blocs, would be able to able to remain there -- if their residents so choose -- until such time that a final agreement is struck. The countries involved in the negotiations would vouch for the settlers' safety, and the IDF would be allowed to operate freely should the need arise.

• In exchange for Israel's withdrawal, all parties involved would recognize Israel as the Jewish state and would ban, by law, any boycott of Israel.

The day the Palestinians freely accept the interim agreement in full, the negotiations for a permanent agreement would be renewed and their demands for the right of return, east Jerusalem and compensation for land used by settlements, could be discussed.

• The pros and cons: The Palestinians will get the majority of the land they seek prior to recognizing Israel as the Jewish homeland, but they would be made to understand that full sovereignty requires concessions on their part. The world and the Arab League would be able to secure the essence of the Palestinians' demands, but it would come at the appropriate diplomatic and international price.

The years to come would see the Middle East adjust to a new reality, which may eventually lend itself to backing the end of the conflict.

Anyone who opposes these ideas should explain why and offer a worthy alternative for us to pursue in our relationship with the Palestinians, the Middle East and the democratic West.

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