U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry will likely hear several incompatible viewpoints when he arrives in Jerusalem on Thursday. But every Israeli official he meets -- from President Shimon Peres to the cabinet ministers -- will have one thing in common: the search for a plan that would set a new deadline for the talks. The Israeli officials understand that if Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas signs off on a new target date (beyond April 2014), he will first have to tout some accomplishments. Otherwise, he will not be able to explain the move to his people. U.S. President Barack Obama first uttered the need for a framework agreement, because he was well aware of Abbas' predicament, and both sides have not stopped mentioning it. The U.S. will be able to formulate the deal's terms in such a way that the two sides will be pressed to make concessions in the future. Israeli officials are not overly concerned by the prospect of a U.S. template for an agreement. They point to 2011, when then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton unveiled a peace plan of sorts. Israel largely accepted it, with various reservations; the Palestinians rejected it. This begs the question, do reservations even matter? Then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin insisted that the official Hebrew version of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement use the term the "Arabs of the Land of Israel." This, he hoped, would counterbalance the term "Palestinian," in the English version. Did this make a difference? No. The rest of the world still considers the English version the authority. By presenting their caveats, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Abbas can assure their people no concessions were made. But strong-willed Americans like Kerry are going to operate under the assumption that both sides have accepted the terms of the agreement, unless, of course, one of them publicly renounces it. But that is unlikely. Netanyahu appears to be falling in line with the American demands. Israel has promised to release prisoners in what it calls a "gesture to the Palestinians," but we all know this was designed to placate Kerry. Netanyahu, at Washington's urging, has tried to postpone the issuing of new settlement construction tenders, even though the coupling of the prisoner release to increased construction in Judea and Samaria can be traced to an American idea. Contrary to some reports, Netanyahu has never offered to exchange Israeli Arab towns for settlement blocs, primarily because he knows it to be a futile endeavor. Israeli Arabs will forever prefer to live as Israeli citizens over becoming residents of a Palestinian state. Both sides will have to swallow hard when they read Kerry's draft, which may be officially showcased when he arrives again two weeks from now. The provisions will likely stipulate that Israel is a "Jewish state," and to make the Palestinians happy, it will state that negotiations will be based on the 1967 borders. The two sides are still at odds on some issues. Israel, it seems, would like the U.S. to finish drafting the agreement so that both sides can add their reservations and then sign it. But the Palestinians want the agreement -- and its reservations -- to be nothing more than a verbal understanding. They want to make sure the caveats don't get published. This, they believe, would be convenient for both sides. The emerging provisions of the agreement would be considered binding down the road. But for now, they are merely auxiliary wheels that could help the Americans and the Israelis attempt to extend the deadline of the talks. Ultimately, the pressures coming out of Jerusalem and Ramallah will carry the day.
