Even if Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah had known beyond the shadow of a doubt that some Arab organization engaging in the Syrian civil war, which has spilled over into Lebanon, assassinated senior officer Hassan al-Laqqis at his Beirut home, he still would have announced without so much as batting an eyelid that Israel was fully responsible for the deed. In the Middle East, lying about such things is totally acceptable. Israel is only slightly different. Jerusalem's policy is ambiguous: neither confirm nor deny. But sometimes the spokesman blushes, revealing to anyone who's watching whether Israel was actually involved or not. It's possible to blame Israel for everything, provided one utters the hollow mantra, "according to foreign sources." Laqqis must have been pretty prodigious in his field, helping develop Hezbollah's technology and weapons engineering efforts. He had to have been rather impressive if Israel actually decided to jeopardize quiet along the northern front with his assassination. Engaging in the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah has faced intensifying rivalries at home in Lebanon. If a Sunni organization wanted to deliver harsh blows to Hezbollah, the kind of harsh blows the Shiite group hadn't seen since Imad Mughniyah was assassinated in 2008, then the current situation was totally advantageous -- and that scenario seems most likely. Israel is positioned at a crossroads, mulling the targeted assassinations of top Hezbollah operatives. On the one hand, the quiet along the northern border has endured. On the other hand, Hezbollah is still operational, sending its fighters to battle in Syria on behalf of Syrian President Bashar Assad. It's in Israel's every interest that Hezbollah founders, dragging Iran down with it. Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon spoke this week about the humanitarian side of Israel's involvement in the Syrian crisis, but Israel also has secret interests related to the violence in Syria. Essentially, Israel's denial or refusal to discuss whether it played a role in Laqqis' assassination this week allows Nasrallah to remain satisfied scare-mongering and pointing fingers without having to set the Upper Galilee aflame; that's Hezbollah's basic cost-benefit analysis. The organization is probably content penciling Nasrallah's comments down in the Hezbollah log; it doesn't want to get involved in a massive shootout across the northern border knowing Israel won't respond when a few errant rockets explode in open pastures. Israeli experts are tuned into the noise in Lebanon. These experts believe that the current relative calm on the northern border doesn't necessitate Israel completely refraining from launching violent attacks. But Israel's moves must be measured; the IDF needs to test the waters before jumping in. Jerusalem doesn't want to exacerbate the situation in the Galilee or force Hezbollah into a corner, where its only option is targeting the north with rocket salvos. The method is set; the objectives and their relative importance are clear. Everything is based on trial and error.
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