As local and regional instability spikes, this coming week will see a major change to one of Israel's oases of calm: the air force. In theory, one commander succeeding another is an ordinary matter, but nonetheless, outgoing Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel is ending an usually long and successful term as Israeli Air Force commander. His successor, Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin, currently head of the IDF Planning Directorate, will have to make quick decisions on a number of matters at a time when there are more questions than answers. Eshel's term garnered less public credit than it perhaps deserved. In the five years and three months he commanded the IAF, Eshel instituted changes the like of which are equaled only by those made by the late Maj. Gen. Benny Peled, who commanded the IAF during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. But unlike Peled, who was forced to make changes in response to the trauma of the war, Eshel took the initiative to improve IAF capabilities and overcome limitations. Eshel's reformations focused on five main areas: Leading Israel's covert operations in the Middle East in an inter-war period with an emphasis on thwarting the transfer of weapons to terrorist organizations; reorganizing the IAF's operational center, with an emphasis on linking intelligence, targets, and bombs, making it many times more productive in times of emergency; executing changes mandated by new, innovative technologies ranging from the F-35 fighter jet to new types of drone aircraft to cyber systems; implementing a multilayer vision of air defense that included bringing the David's Sling ground-based defense system into operation and establishing an additional company to operate the existing Iron Dome system; and deepening the IAF's cooperation with Israel's ground forces, such as when Eshel personally commanded air support missions to assist Golani Brigade forces in trouble during Operation Protective Edge in the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2014. But Eshel's influence extended beyond the air force. He was an important figure in the General Staff headquarters, and one of the generals closest to IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, who wanted Eshel as his second-in-command. Eshel, who believed he had no chance of ever being appointed chief of staff, preferred to retire. It is doubtful that his retirement from the military marks a departure from public service. In the past, suggestions have been floated that he be appointed to the Mossad or the National Security Council, but it's also possible that a diplomatic posting, as Israel's ambassador to Washington or to the U.N. could serve as a springboard into civilian life, or even politics. Eshel's seniority, which stem from his age (58), experience, and character, made him a heavyweight, and not just in the IDF, but also when dealing with other branches of the defense and security establishment and with the top political echelon. He was never prepared to take anything for granted or because "that's what was decided"; everything needed a reason and context. Eshel never hesitated to approach the prime minister, defense minister, or the cabinet with arguments or appeals. Often, he brought them over to his way of thinking. The new posting will also be a test for Norkin. He is younger than Eshel (51), less experienced, and despite his self-confidence, he will be facing difficult situations in which he will need to block plenty of whims, and do so knowing that some people might call him a coward or delusional. The IAF has a unique role in the country's defense, and its commander -- Norkin, starting next Monday -- is not only an operational decision-maker, but also a strategist who often has to do not only what is possible, but what is desirable. Like Eshel, Norkin is close to the IDF chief, who picked him to succeed Eshel because he combines the ability to plan with the ability to carry out plans. The two worked closely together when Eizenkot was head of the IDF's Operations Directorate during the 2006 Second Lebanon War, and Norkin -- head of the IAF's Operations Directorate, a role he concluded after the attack on Syria's nuclear reactor in 2007, which has been attributed to Israel. Eizenkot also gives Norkin a lot of credit for leading the implementation of the IDF's "Gideon" multiyear work plan. But that plan explicitly makes the ground forces a priority, and as head of the IAF, Norkin will have to live with it and all its implications on the air force's budget, training, supplies, and personnel. The decisions Norkin will be making in the near future will determine the face of the IAF for decades to come. These include the question of whether to acquire more F-35s, beyond the 50 that Israel has already agreed to buy; switching out the IAF's fleet of helicopters; purchasing more fueling and cargo aircraft; closing bases -- Ramat David in Northern Israel and Sde Dov at the north end of Tel Aviv -- while leaving breathing room for emergencies; reducing training time for some squadrons and moving them to flight simulators in response to changes expected as the F-35 stealth fighters are integrated into the IAF; and reducing the number of reservist pilots. These are only a few of the issues Norkin will have to address. In addition, there is the matter of to what extent the IAF's technical systems should be privatized; significant challenges in maintaining quality personnel not only in the flight crews, but also in air defense and intelligence; and even questions about service conditions, such as whether the family accommodations at the Tel Nof, Hatzor, and Palmachim bases should be shut down. Alongside these decisions, Norkin will have to direct the IAF in an operational environment that is growing ever more complicated, given the Russian presence, with its advanced aircraft and anti-aircraft systems, and the concern that despite coordination, Israel could wind up in a confrontation with Russia; the simultaneous presence of the U.S., which demands closer coordination and oversight; and the growing strength of Hezbollah, including weapons that pose a challenge for the air force; along with the standard operational challenges of actions in densely populated areas, such as Gaza, that will require the IAF to develop weapons that will allow for precision strikes in urban areas and limit collateral damage as much as possible. Because the IAF is so important, Norkin has a central, special role to play in the nation's defense for the next few years. From now on, the responsibility for all the tools that give Israel deterrence and victory lies on his shoulders.
