'Eviction of Samaria communities in 2005 failed to meet objectives'

Maj. Gen. (ret.) Yair Naveh retired from the Israel Defense Forces nearly three years ago. His last role was as IDF deputy chief of staff, but he is most remembered for his role as the GOC Central Command who was involved in the disengagement from the Gaza Strip in 2005.

In the unilateral disengagement from the coastal enclave, Israel evicted Gush Katif, a bloc of 17 communities in southern Gaza, and pulled back to its 1967 border with the Gaza Strip. It also evicted four secluded settlements in northern Samaria. The disengagement, during which 8,600 Israelis lost their homes, remains highly controversial to this day, as many believe it is directly linked to the increased terrorist activity and rocket fire emanating from Gaza since then.

As head of Central Command, Naveh oversaw the eviction of the northern Samaria communities of Kadim, Ganim, Homesh and Sa-Nur. The operation was far smaller and less dramatic than in Gush Katif, but Naveh's membership in the national-religious sector presented him with a personal challenge.

Twelve years on, as a group of coalition lawmakers plan to introduce legislation that would allow the residents of the four Samaria settlements evicted in 2005 to re-establish their communities, Naveh says the unilateral disengagement from Gaza was a mistake, telling Israel Hayom that reality has proved the move failed to generate any security or diplomatic advantage for Israel.

He also believes that Israel should seriously consider turning back the clock for two of the Samarian settlements, Homesh, northwest of Nablus, and Sa-Nur, northwest of Jenin, as repopulating them could serve Israel's security interests.

"I was named [GOC Central Command] in 2004, when we already knew there was going to be some evictions in northern Samaria," Naveh says, recalling the months leading up to the disengagement.

"The decision was that the area was going to remain in Israeli hands, and the question was, what were we going to do with it? Why was this necessary? The answer we were given was that this move stemmed from diplomatic considerations rather than security considerations, apparently in an attempt to promote an opportunity for future negotiations [with the Palestinians]."

Q: Were you able to understand the political logic behind the eviction in real time-

"I was able to promote the understanding that the IDF has to remain in the area in question, that this sector is strategically important because it allows control over the Jenin area," he says of the West Bank city notorious for being a terrorist stronghold, most notably for the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, Fatah's military wing.

"Against this backdrop, it was clear that we had to remain in control there. I didn't understand why we had to evict the settlements."

Q: Did you try to prevent the eviction?

"Early in the discussions, I asked why we needed to do it. I was told it was a political decision meant to propel future diplomatic moves. We were up against a wall of politicians who insisted the eviction had to go through, so the entire negotiations focused on the security sectors."

Q: After all this time, what do you think about this move-

"There's no doubt that we weren't able to generate any sort of security advantage, neither in Gaza nor in Samaria. There may have been diplomatic logic to this move in Gaza. Those settlements were not set up with a comprehensive vision in mind. Had we been told at the time of the disengagement that we were reconfiguring the settlements to create two blocs in the Gaza Strip, in the north and south, including a link to the Green Line and with maintaining our presence on the border with Egypt, it could have generated a security advantage, but the decision was to pursue a complete eviction.

"As for the diplomatic logic -- we may have benefited after the fact from the ability to prove that there's no connection between terrorism and the settlement enterprise. The fact is we left Gaza completely and terrorism is rampant. Moreover, the way the eviction of Gush Katif was carried out has a message for the future. An eviction of this nature cannot be carried out in such a way again."

According to Naveh, "At the time, I suggested to postpone the disengagement by a year or two. Israel could have used that time to build new communities for the evacuees outside the Gaza Strip, preserve their communities and relocate their greenhouses. This would have allowed everyone to move to their new homes in their familiar communities. This wasn't done and it created the difficult eviction model we experienced, whereby to this day there are families who have not been able to find new homes and employment.

"We did things differently in northern Samaria. I personally visited various places to find a location to which the residents of the four communities could be relocated, and in many cases by that time [of the eviction] the residents had permanent homes to move to.

"If the disengagement from Gaza contributed anything to history, it did so by proving that terrorism has nothing to do with the settlement enterprise, but there was no such advantage in northern Samaria. There was no advantage to this eviction. None. Zero. Nothing has changed for the better there. It had no added value to security or to anything else. It was a frustrating event that left a feeling that it was all for nothing."

Q: Did you ever consider refusing to carry out the eviction-

"The thought had crossed my mind, yes. But you have to understand -- and maybe part of the national religious community won't agree with me here -- that had I decided not to do it, two days later someone else would have.

"This could have meant that a kippah-wearing man may never reach a position of this level again. It would have sent us back to the days where the top military echelon was perceived as divided between those who were 'for us' and those who were 'against us.' It was clear to me that despite my personal reservations, I had to do it.

"Because of where I came from, there was a big difference between how the Central Command and the Southern Command carried out their plans. No one under my command refused orders. Both the soldiers and the residents were treated completely differently, and we worked with the regional council, which is why the northern Samaria eviction didn't scar Israeli society the way the Gush Katif eviction did."

Q: Is resettling these communities today the right thing to do-

"Homesh and Sa-Nur are significant from a security standpoint, so the answer is yes. As for Kadim and Ganim, the answer to that question is more complex and has to be reviewed in depth."

Q: The national religious public to which you belong vehemently opposed the disengagement, and many felt that it was a real crisis. Some of the anger and frustration was directed at you. Do you feel that you are paying a price for what happened-

"To be honest, not really. It [the evicted Samaria area] wasn't a high-profile area like the Gaza communities, and its eviction left no scars on Israeli society.

"I hate to say it, but the fact that after the disengagement from Gaza they housed the residents in something of a refugee camp in [the southern community of] Nitzan served everyone's interests. The Right showed everyone how disastrous the eviction was, and the Left showed everyone the grave price of an involuntary eviction. We didn't have that in Samaria. If the mirror image of Gush Katif had been set up outside of Gaza, including all the settlements, greenhouses and homes, things would have turned out differently."

Homesh first

Next week, a group of coalition lawmakers from the Lobby for the Annulment of the Disengagement plans to hold a conference and introduce a bill to allow the former residents of Kadim, Ganim, Homesh and Sa-Nur to re-establish their communities.

Unlike the Gush Katif communities that were razed immediately after the disengagement, the four Samaria communities evicted in 2005 were left standing, turning into ghost towns in an area that remains under the IDF's control.

It is surreal to see these communities 12 years later. The homes, roads, infrastructure and parks are all there. Only the people are missing. The IDF moves through the communities on occasional operations, but that's it. The former residents of Homesh and Sa-Nur refuse to accept their fate and long for the day when they can return to their homes.

A bill to resurrect the four communities was introduced during the previous government's term, but as it also included unrealistic articles to resurrect Gush Katif settlements, it failed to pass a Knesset vote. As the new bill focuses solely on Kadim, Ganim, Homesh and Sa-Nur, its proponents believe it has a good chance of passing.

Next week's conference is the brainchild of Samaria Regional Council head Yossi Dagan and Habayit Hayehudi MK Shuli Mualem-Rafaeli. The bill, dubbed the "Homesh First" plan, is co-sponsored by Mualem-Rafaeli, Coalition Chairman MK David Bitan, Likud MKs Yoav Kisch, Nurit Koren, Amir Ohana and Avraham Neguise, Habayit Hayehudi MKs Bezalel Smotrich and Moti Yogev, and Shas MKs Yakov Margi and Michael Malchieli.

"The northern Samaria settlements that were destroyed during the disengagement were set up in Area C, on state-owned land where security falls to the IDF, just like my home in Gush Etzion," Mualem-Rafaeli says. "To this day, their status remains unchanged, apart from a law forbidding Jews from living there."

Dagan is a former resident of Sa-Nur.

"Twelve years later, I still think of the expulsion. I stood on the roof of the [old British] citadel and saw security forces dragging the residents away, while on the mountain across from me, 150 Arabs were dancing and cheering. In that moment I swore that I would do everything in my power to return home and fly the Israeli flag over Sa-Nur," he says.

A year and a half ago, Dagan and the "Homesh First" lobby met with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. This was during the Obama administration, which presented Israel with the "not one brick" demand with respect to construction across Judea and Samaria.

Netanyahu listened to the former residents of northern Samaria, but there was nothing he could do. Next week's conference, the lobby members hope, will mark the beginning of a change.

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