In the office of Brig. Gen. Itzik Turgeman, outgoing commander of the IDF's 36th Armored Division, hangs a picture of him embracing then-Chief of Staff Lt. Col. Benny Gantz. Today Turgeman enjoys recalling the moment it was taken. But that moment was preceded by a not inconsiderable period of frustration. When he assumed the position, the 36th Division was in charge of the Israeli-Syrian border, overseeing a number of combat units. Two years ago, after the fighting in the Syrian civil war reached the Golan Heights, Gantz decided to transfer responsibility for the area to the 210th Division. Turgeman was one of the most vocal opponents of the move. "The descent from the Golan Heights was accompanied by concern about a drop in the division's standing because of the loss of [its] territory. We came down off the Golan amid great disappointment," Turgeman tells the Israel Hayom weekend supplement. Only many months later, during Operation Protective Edge, was he able to admit he was wrong -- that it had been correct, even vital, for the division to leave the Golan Heights. "Benny Gantz was the one who wanted to hear me say that more than anyone. During Protective Edge, I hugged him and said, 'You really came through, it was the best decision.' And [Gantz] answered, 'I told you so.'" As part of the change to the division's assignment, it was decided to train it to fight with the Southern Command. A target date was set for it to be ready for an operation in the Gaza Strip: July 15, 2014. A week before that, Operation Protective Edge was launched. "The operation turned out to be a division drill. We couldn't have had a better one," Turgeman says. Turgeman was one of three division commanders who oversaw last summer's Gaza war, and the fighting in his area of command was among the most complicated. "The green light was given on a Friday evening," Turgeman says. "The 162nd Division entered the northern [part of the] Strip, Mickey [Brig. Gen. Mickey Edelstein, then commander of the IDF's Gaza Division] entered from the south, and we were supposed to enter central Gaza. Before the incursion we saw intelligence about the population milling around Shujayyia. The command head and the chief of staff were with me and I asked them to delay the invasion by 24 hours. It was clear that going into and fighting in Shujayyia would stop us very soon, because there would be very heavy civilian casualties." You weren't concerned that delaying the ground incursion into Shujayyia would give Hamas a chance to prepare itself better and lead to more IDF wounded? "We took into account that the delay would give them another 24 hours to get ready. But the [civilian] population that was outside, which maybe acted as human shields, was the first obstacle we could identify. If we had been given the command to enter, we would have, but the price was unreasonable. We didn't see men out in the street -- we saw women and children. The day of the incursion I took all the division's drones and flew them over Shujayyia to see that the streets were empty. No one was there. "Maybe Hamas was better prepared because of the delay in the incursion, and maybe Shujayyia was a tougher nut to crack from the get-go. One thing is certain: The first 24 hours the Golani Brigade fought, under the command of the 36th Division, are remembered as the toughest time of Operation Protective Edge. Shortly after we went in the disaster occurred, when a 113-M APC was hit and seven soldiers were killed; the Golani Brigade commander was wounded, and so was the commander of the Egoz Unit." In hindsight, was it right to send the Golani soldiers into the Gaza Strip in outdated 113-M APCs? "Rasan [Col. Rasan Alian, the Golani Brigade commander] wanted to go in on foot, without APCs -- but with the number of mortars they were firing at us, that wasn't an option. The mortar threat was very real. If we had gone [in] on foot there would have been more wounded, although we can't prove that." According to Turgeman, "The IDF will use APCs in the next war, too, in the north and in the south. It's part of the battle preparation. Infantry troops will be taken by APCs to the outskirts of the urban area and from there will go on foot. But they won't get as close in the 113-M as they got to Shujayyia." The death of Staff Sgt. Oron Shaul and the abduction of his remains left an open wound. His body has not yet been returned to Israel. "It's a personal disappointment to me that I didn't get Oron Shaul back," Turgeman says. "I feel a moral obligation to Oron's parents, Zehava and Herzl, to continue doing everything possible to bring him back to be laid to rest in Israel. I carry that incident with me." Another difficult incident that stays with Turgeman was when Golani Brigade commander Alian was wounded. "He's a very strong man, both physically and mentally. Rasan told me, 'Come in, I've been wounded, I'm OK.' Then he was quiet. I heard his voice fading. I called him and he didn't answer. His intelligence officer told me he lost consciousness. Rasan wouldn't collapse from nothing. Then I heard the report about Roi and Yonatan (battalion commanders who were also wounded.) My battalion commanders were leading the forces. They and the company commanders led the fighting, and they were the ones wounded." One of the casualties was company commander Capt. Dmitri Levitas, killed by a Palestinian sniper on July 22. Levitas' death has recently been the topic of headlines because of the decision by the IDF Investigative Unit to open an investigation into his commander, Lt. Col. Neria Yeshurun, who eulogized Levitas over the radio and then ordered his troops to fire a salvo to "honor and salute" him at the medical clinic from which the sniper shot him. Although the matter is still being investigated, Turgeman is sure Yeshurun acted correctly. "Only entities that don't really like us call that place a 'clinic.' They shot at us a number of times from that clinic. The shooting claimed the life of an officer, a company commander. We didn't just happen to be in the area. There was a [terror] tunnel. From a commander's perspective, Neria did the right thing, and from an operational perspective it was right to fire on the clinic," Turgeman says. "Nevertheless, his statement over the radio was pathetic. I don't expect commanders to fire salvos, certainly not 'honor salvos.' You don't hold ceremonies during fighting. I think that's the only thing he did wrong, and I told him so. It sends the wrong message to the soldiers. We fire to eliminate threats, not to shut people up, not to make noise, and not to frighten. But I'm backing Neria -- he's a combat officer." Except for the Yeshurun incident and another incident in which a Golani soldier stole money from a Palestinian home, the IDF has not launched any other investigations against the division. Turgeman is pleased about that. "We're an army. We have to be self-critical," he says. "The [IDF] Investigative Unit is our own, but I think that we should stop with the operational investigations. There have been investigations that determined that we were wrong, that there were mistakes. Uncertainty rules in war, and there will be mistakes in the next one, too. In the wars to come, in the third Lebanon war, the firepower against the Israeli homefront will force us to be more aggressive so we can get results quicker." To what extent will the IDF investigations opened following Protective Edge influence commanders' decision-making in the next war? "I'm sure that it has an effect and will affect wartime decisions. I want to believe that war, the heat of battle, and the intensity of making decisions will let commanders forget that the military investigative unit could show up later. Of course it has an effect. If we were to hand out a questionnaire now, people probably wouldn't answer truthfully. Mentally, it affects us all. It makes me angry that we have to deal with a military investigation and prove [ourselves]. I want to believe that in the end, I'll see all the matters involving the division closed with no indictment." Turgeman is poised to take over as head of the IDF Ground Forces Headquarters. His responsibilities will include implementing the IDF's new Gideon multi-year work plan, if it is approved by the political echelon. There is no argument that the plan, along with the Locker Report, has caused unpleasantness among career soldiers. Many officers and non-commissioned officers, particularly young ones, are currently looking at options other than the military, and senior officials in the General Staff have expressed concern that seeds of "mediocrity" are being sown. "The current atmosphere in the IDF is not good," Turgeman acknowledges. "People are leaving. I can't keep people on as professional army, especially in support positions. ... I used to have two or three candidates for every position; today, I'm looking for personnel. And when you look for people, you take people who are less good. We aren't an army that can allow itself less good people. We don't have a second chance to win. "I'm still not seeing combat officers and company commanders leaving, but we could find ourselves in a crisis in which the best aren't staying with us. Today we still have first-rate commanders. I say 'still,' but I'm adding a question mark and asking until when. This issue comes up in every conversation with the chief of staff." Turgeman sees a process of fundamental change in the army. "Since 2014, we've sent 2,500 career soldiers home, and there are plans to do the same with a similar number. This is an organizational shift, and it's hard for us to accept changes. On one hand, the State of Israel is telling us something. It's looking for a more efficient military, and we are the army of the state." But the changes in the military and how it is perceived create difficult pitfalls for those who continue to serve. "A career soldier wants to be valued in his organization, and wants society to value him. He gets up in the morning, goes to work, and works hard. A career soldier [in a support position] doesn't earn much more than minimum wage. Sometimes it's hard for me to look them in the eyes, and not only because of the salaries but because of what [people] say about them. It's a tough time. Some say, 'Leave, it will pass.' I don't see it that way. We should explain [things] to the society we serve. And military service is not about money. The minute the conversation touches on money, it will be hard for my commanders and I to look a soldier in the eye and send him on a mission he might not come back from." Turgeman believes that cutting back the number of career soldiers along with reducing the length of compulsory service for male conscripts will necessitate the closure of some units, despite the fact that Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot has issued instructions that the army's combat strength remain unaffected by the changes. "Cutting back on another 2,000 career soldiers, and shortening [compulsory] service, which reduces the sources on which we can draw, will force us to close units and cut back on operations. We won't have a choice," Turgeman says. "There are two possibilities: to thin out [manpower] across the board, so everyone has fewer conscripts and career soldiers, or to close down operations. Cutbacks mean that we either forgo an operation, like the Education Corps, or forgo a battalion."
