Not a day passes without a new and dramatic declaration by some senior Israeli official, usually anonymously, about the situation in Syria. One day we hear a threat that Israel will topple the Assad regime if it responds to attempts to prevent the transfer of advanced weapons to Hezbollah, and the next day we hear a more soothing message that Israel actually prefers that Syrian President Bashar al-Assad remain in power. On Sunday, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said Israel would continue to act if necessary, hinting at further attacks in Syria, to prevent weapons shipments to Hezbollah, while on Wednesday, Air Force Chief Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel said Israel must prepare for the possibility of a surprise war on the Golan Heights and for the sudden and immediate collapse of the Assad regime. This barrage of messages makes it seem as if Israel wants to have its cake and eat it, too. Indeed, Israel is determined to prevent weapons from reaching Hezbollah, but at the same time it is seeking to lower the flame that could turn into a regional fire if Israel acts to do precisely that. Israel also wants to weaken Assad and prevent his acquisition of sophisticated Russian weaponry, but it simultaneously is seeking to prevent the outbreak of all-out war, which could lead to deep Israeli involvement inside Syria and to the downfall of the Assad regime. With its recent reported actions in Syria, Israel gambled on Assad's weakness. The Syrian president is perceived as being completely preoccupied by his struggle for survival against the rebels, and the assumption was that he would avoid getting dragged into a conflict with Israel which could expedite his defeat. Assad's weakness has opened, in turn, a window of opportunity for Israel, but it has also created a point of uncertainty and risk for us. This is because a weak dictator devoid of assets, like Assad, may feel freer to act, with a wider range of maneuverability, against Israel. After all, his country's primary infrastructure installations, which he tried protecting from Israel, have already been destroyed by the rebels. This leaves Israel with only the Judgment Day weapon -- the overthrow of his regime. This weapon should only be used as a last resort, not as a response to errant fire on an Israeli military patrol on the Golan Heights or after a missile is fired against Israeli jets. The real problem for Israel is that, in contrast to the conviction of its senior officials' declarations, Israel's policy on Syria is actually far less clear and firm. Jerusalem has yet to decide if it is interested in Assad's downfall or whether it wants, along with Hezbollah, Iran and Russia, for him to stay. Israel also has not decided if preventing Hezbollah from acquiring more missiles, beyond the tens of thousands it already has, justifies the risk of starting an all-out war with Syria, a war that apparently no one wants but could happen if the cycle of Israeli preventive attacks and Syrian responses plays out. Regardless, such a war would not come as the surprise which Eshel warned against, but would be completely predictable.
