The increased tension between Israel and Syria has coincided with Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's recent military victories. Assad's regime has regained the offensive in the Syrian civil war. His forces have successfully repelled the rebels' attacks on the capital and on Aleppo, the second-largest city in Syria. With the help of his allies, Hezbollah, he has regained control over several strategic sites that had been bitterly contested for several months. It seems, then, that the expert analyses that predicted Assad's imminent downfall were premature. In fact, the way things are right now, he might actually emerge as the victor. Assad's victories on the battlefield should not come as a surprise if you consider the all-out support from his allies: Russia, Iran and Hezbollah. Western powers, on the other hand, have been hesitant and indecisive; they have paid lip service to the internally divided Syrian opposition by making hollow statements. In the grand scheme of things, Assad is understandably gun shy when it comes to Israel. Engaging Israel militarily might take his eyes off the ball in the bigger campaign: the fight against the Syrian rebels, who are his real enemies. But Assad does not have an unlimited supply of restraint and his forbearance may ultimately run out. Israel should take that into account. Over the past several weeks Israel has tried to exploit Assad's weaknesses by introducing new rules, among them that Israel can veto any arms shipment to Hezbollah that includes advanced weapon systems. Israel would also like veto power over the Syrian military's acquisition of advanced weaponry such as the S-300 surface to air missile system. Although he has so far stayed away from a confrontation with Israel, Assad may ultimately conclude that perpetual restraint is a form of weakness. It could hurt him more than a an all-out war with his neighbor to the south. Last week it was reported that Israel had threatened that a retaliation would result in a painful Israeli response to the point that his regime could collapse. But Israel's population centers might very well be targeted by Syria if war breaks out, as Assad goes down. A retaliation does not necessarily mean Syria would launch an all-out war. Over the past several years, Damascus has repeatedly warned that the conflagration in Syria could spread to its neighbors. Damascus has not claimed responsibility for the mortar fire on Mount Hermon last week, nor did it admit it was involved in the recent bombing in southern Turkey, but it should not come as a surprise that Ankara was quick to point the finger at Assad as the likely, and chief, culprit. Israel has been grappling with the question of who it should root for. This dilemma dates back to the earliest stages of the Syrian revolution. Would its interests be better served by a Hezbollah-and-Iran-backed Assad holding on to power, or by having the Islamic opposition emerge victorious. Israel may unintentionally become heavily involved in Syria. It can decide who wins: Assad or his enemies.
Perhaps brinkmanship is the only viable option Israel has, but such a policy must be pursued consciously. Israel must not go down that path without planning first.
