Israel's leadership was fully exposed on Monday on Channel 2 TV's investigative program "Uvda" (Fact), which may as well have been a campaign ad for former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert. Even from a technical viewpoint, while Olmert was fully lit on camera, Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu after him were filmed in partial darkness. Olmert spoke a mile a minute, while host Ilana Dayan kept cutting Barak and Netanyahu off after every syllable they uttered. But that was the least of it. A national leadership that, on the verge of a volatile confrontation, is unable to prevent a leak about a potential military operation, really needs to do some soul searching. This sensitive information has been making the rounds for about two years, since the horror show that accompanied the resignation of former Mossad director Meir Dagan. So, did former Israel Defense Forces Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Gabi Ashkenazi prepare the IDF for an operation or not? Did he say he did but actually didn't? Or did he do it but say he didn't? Should we believe his word or Barak's? As of now, the answer is not clear. But judging from the testimonies in the Harpaz affair (in which Ashkenazi was implicated in a maneuver attempting to discredit a candidate to succeed him as IDF chief) as an indication of Ashkenazi's credibility, on the issue of a potential Iran strike I would tend to believe the defense minister over the former IDF chief. Ashkenazi may be nicer and more popular, but Barak is more honest and precise. Did Netanyahu intend to "steal the decision to go to war" as Dagan suggested? That is a bad joke. Clearly a decision to launch an attack would be illegal if it was made only by Netanyahu's close circle of ministers. But obviously the prime minister and the defense minister need to order the IDF to prepare a detailed plan before bringing it to a vote by the Political-Security Cabinet. The Israel Air Force planned the bombing of the nuclear reactor in Iraq under the orders of then-Prime Minister Menachem Begin long before the plan was approved by the cabinet. According to Ashkenazi, a simple flexing of muscles by the IDF is likely to spark real reaction. A finger on a trigger increases the chances of a shot being fired, clearly. That is why there is a safety switch. But the assumption that it will happen anyway, or is very likely to happen, is just too simplistic. It's okay, and even recommended, that the IDF prepare. Preparation does not necessarily lead to fighting. It is a "walking-on-the-edge" policy dangerous, but legitimate. So what really happened? Olmert did give the Mossad a lot of freedom, but Iran kept moving forward with its nuclear program and the world was standing idly by. It was precisely the credibility of the military threats made by Netanyahu and Barak that brought about a unique diplomatic achievement: Most of the world is now imposing sanctions on Iran. This achievement will continue to be unique even if it is ultimately not sufficient to stop Iran's nuclear ambitions. In order to create credibility, Netanyahu and Barak had to keep the plan to themselves. Former Israel Security Agency chief Yuval Diskin thought their motives were "messianic." That's legitimate. But there were those on the opposing side, including at this newspaper, who believed at the time that the objective was different, more sophisticated to enlist the world to join Israel in isolating Iran, not to attack Iran before the U.S. elections. Former prime ministers Ariel Sharon and Olmert were not able to enlist the world in such a way. The facts are the facts. The height of Channel 2's distorted reporting was when the program asked whether it was possible that a government would take action against the advice of an IDF chief. In the distant past, children were taught that this is precisely how democracy works. Someone has apparently forgotten.
