The reaction of top Hamas officials to Friday's assassination of Mazen Faqha in the Gaza Strip left little room for doubt: Retaliation is coming, the only question is how far the terrorist group is willing to go and whether Faqha's death is reason enough to trigger a full-blown escalation at this time. It is safe to say Hamas is shocked, perhaps too shocked to think clearly. Faqha's assassination came out of the blue, seemingly detached from the usual border-adjacent and tunnel-oriented battleground. Hamas may have automatically blamed Israel, but it is still likely to investigate the incident before retaliating, and we are likely to hear reports of collaborators' arrests and "confessions." Newly elected Hamas leader in Gaza Yahya Sinwar is unlikely to opt for restraint after the killing of one of his top operatives, who was also a close friend. Sinwar visited the scene Friday, and it is likely he understood that exercising restraint at this time would set the bar higher for future would-be assassins. Perhaps high enough to threaten him. The key to Hamas' potential retaliation lies with the question of how well the organization is prepared for a fresh round of hostilities with Israel, and how much it wants it at this time. Since Operation Protective Edge in 2014, Hamas has rehabilitated many of its abilities, including its grid of terror tunnels, rocket production capabilities and drone operations. But its rearmament efforts have been slower than expected, as smuggling weapons and other components from Egypt has become exceedingly harder. Gaza's rulers are facing serious domestic difficulties as well, namely the soaring unemployment in the enclave, the dire economic situation and the growing challenge posed by the Salafi groups in the Strip. Provoking a conflict with Israel would allow Hamas' leadership to distract the public from their daily hardships and unite around the shared hatred of Israel. On the other hand, a fresh clash with Israel would do little to alleviate Gaza's problems and worse -- it may cause Hamas to lose control of the Strip, especially given Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman's statements that a future Gaza campaign would see Israel strive to topple Hamas rule. Hamas will strive to balance its desire to retaliate with the concern of rapid escalation. It is therefore possible that Hamas would seek an equal target, such as a senior IDF officer, for example. Until such time as things become clearer, the IDF would be wise to minimize its objectives, stay away from the border fence and avoid unnecessary risks. This is the same course of action taken on the Syrian and Lebanese borders following several assassinations foreign media has attributed to Israel in recent years. But Hamas may opt for a different course of action. The 1996 assassination of archterrorist Yahya Ayyash resulted in a bloody wave of terror that claimed the lives of dozens of Israelis. Hamas may choose to launch a wave of terrorism in or via Judea and Samaria, to both distance itself from the operations and land its rival, the Palestinian Authority, in hot water, as Ramallah would be seen as the guilty party. This, by the way, was exactly the type of operations Faqha had worked on: setting up Hamas cells in Judea and Samaria to carry out mass terrorist attacks and high-profile abductions. Israel would be wise to brace for Hamas' response, and it should be on high alert in both the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. As Israel does not want a security escalation, it must spare no effort to prevent it, including involving third parties, such as Egypt, to try to alleviate tensions. Hamas is unlikely to contain Faqha's assassination, but Israel should strive to contain its response, as it is the only way to avoid an unwanted escalation that could rapidly deteriorate into war.
