The findings in State Comptroller Yosef Shapira's report on Operation Protective Edge came with little surprise. The gist was already known, especially the failed decision-making process and the fact that the IDF was ill-prepared for the threat posed by Hamas' grid of terror tunnels. Still the detailed, systematic outline of events leaves one with a clear sense of discomfort over how things were handled, mainly because it completely contradicts the arguments made by the report's "heroes" in recent months. The IDF's argument that it engaged intensely with the issue of the terror tunnels was contradicted with findings indicating the IDF classified the tunnels as a secondary threat and launched the military campaign in the Gaza Strip unprepared and without the proper battle plans -- and worse, it failed to destroy the tunnel grid in full, as it claimed to have done when the operation concluded. The political echelon, which argued that the tunnel threat was discussed at length, effectively sidelined the issue, and members of the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet were not properly briefed. The report clearly indicates that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon did not share information with the cabinet, whose ministers, for their part, showed little to no interest in the issue. This resulted in superficial, tactical, for-the-record discussions, far from the serious tone required from the body tasked with making life-and-death decisions. Shapira's report did not seek to review the nature of the decisions made during the operation, only the process itself, or the lack thereof. It is this lack of true process that is truly troubling: The absolute avoidance of dealing with policy issues and strategic purpose -- namely, the question of what Israel would like to see happen in the Gaza Strip -- resulted in very little attention being paid to critical issues, such as the humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The report found that had the cabinet dealt with the issues in the proper order and in due time, measures could have been taken that could have prevented the campaign or changed its course, and, by implication, also saved lives. In this respect, the report should be a wake-up call, because the current decision-making processes in the cabinet are not fundamentally different than the ones followed in 2014. Israel has yet to define its objectives with respect to the Gaza Strip, or, for that matter, Lebanon, in the event of a confrontation with Hezbollah. Most ministers still care far too little, unless there is a headline in it for them; and the military is still flying blind on the one hand, while on the other hand -- and in the absence of clear objectives and a properly functioning National Security Council -- it is navigating the decisions of the political echelon. Netanyahu, Ya'alon and then-IDF Chief Benny Gantz point to the peace and quiet achieved in the south following Operation Protective Edge, and rightly so; but the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza and the rise of extreme elements there mean a fresh security escalation is only a matter of time. The military has already said it is studying Shapira's report and working to implement the necessary conclusions to be better prepared for future hostilities. It is up to the cabinet to define the IDF's objectives and make sure it meets them, as well as make sure the military is ready for future conflicts, not past ones. This is especially true with regard to the terror tunnels, an issue that has been somewhat blown out of proportion. The proper decision-making process should ensure this happens. Shapira hardly stumbled on something new; his findings were clearly evident from any major military campaign carried out over the last few decades. The government has been given a chance to effect change, and it must do so not only out of deference to those who fell in previous wars, but to prevent future fatalities.
