The state comptroller's report on the cabinet's performance during Operation Protective Edge will be published only early next week, but we already know the bottom line: harsh criticism, not excluding personal appraisals, about the management of the war by the diplomatic-security leadership -- Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, then-Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon and then-IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz. In and of itself, the report rehashes what anyone who has lived here over the past two and a half years already knows: According to the comptroller, the underground tunnel threat was not presented to the cabinet in full and in a timely manner; the IDF did not have a suitable plan to confront the tunnels and depended primarily on improvisations; and worse of all, Israel was dragged into a military operation without defining its desired long-term solution in Gaza. The comptroller places the brunt of the blame on the political echelon. He cites the lack of sufficient groundwork ahead of time; the National Security Council's inability to recommend alternatives; and the systematic compartmentalization of ministers. The IDF, meanwhile, is criticized for the gap between advance intelligence warnings (with the Shin Bet security agency) about the tunnel threat and the lack of an applicable operative countermeasure, and it is criticized for its management of the war, which was also noted by the IDF itself in the piercing internal investigation conducted by Maj. Gen. Yossi Bachar. Netanyahu and Ya'alon, and to a certain degree Gantz as well, claim the comptroller is ignoring the results of the operation: zero civilian casualties caused by the tunnels; Hamas' failure to achieve any strategic victories; and almost completely unprecedented quiet in the Gaza sector in the 30 months since the fighting ended. These arguments are mostly correct, but are irrelevant to the criticism: Sounder preparation and management of the operation could have led to better results, in less time and at a lower cost. On a professional level, the report requires action to be taken on two tracks. The first pertains to the cabinet, the way it works and its degree of responsibility for the diplomatic and security-related actions taken by the country. The ministers know too little, too late, and as a rule the prime minister and defense minister view most ministers as rivals rather than partners. Although the Netanyahu government is nothing new in this regard -- its predecessors functioned in largely the same manner -- that is still little consolation: The cabinet also has a legal responsibility, a moral duty and cumulative wisdom and experience; if the ministers would recognize this and do their jobs, they could contribute to the security of the country. The second track pertains to the fact that Israel has still not defined what it wants from Gaza strategically. This is not only crucial to how we define the other side and the way we engage it (diplomatically, economically, humanely), it has to be the cornerstone of all future IDF operational plans regarding Gaza. In actuality -- during Protective Edge and today as well -- the order is backward and crooked: The IDF devises plans, and the political echelon derives its goals from them. Almost none of this, however, matters to the public, and certainly not to politicians. It is all perceived as a Rashomon scenario, in that there are varying interpretations of the same reality -- who said what to whom and when, who benefits and who loses. From this perspective, it is fascinating to see that Netanyahu, Ya'alon and Gantz -- who worked so closely together during the operation and testified to its unprecedented success upon its conclusion -- now find themselves in the same boat. On the surface, it seems the person who benefits most from the comptroller's report is Education Minister Naftali Bennett, who has managed to convince the comptroller that he was "the first to spot the problem." But his claims to having some sort of magical formula for ultimate victory are exaggerated and childish. All he has to do is glance over at Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman to see the difference between a cabinet member seeking political gain and a minister who feels the heavy weight of actual responsibility on his shoulders.
