On the surface, there is nothing unusual about the alleged airstrike foreign media outlets claim the Israeli Air Force carried out in Syria on Wednesday. This is not the first time the foreign media has attributed airstrikes in Syria to Israel, nor will it be the last. Such operations are in line with Israeli's policy not to allow Hezbollah to get its hands on game-changing weapons, such as precision missiles and advanced anti-aircraft and anti-ship systems. Still, Wednesday's strike was different. Not only because of its targets -- a Hezbollah-bound arms convoy and a weapons warehouse west of Damascus, according to Syrian state media -- but because for the first time, a strike was carried out with the Russian air defenses over Syria in play. These defenses include S-300 and S-400 radar and missile systems that cover Syria, Lebanon and substantial parts of Israel, which allow the Russians a full view of any movements in Israel's northern airspace. This is a significant challenge for the Israeli Air Force, as the Russian eye in the sky limits the near-complete freedom of operation Israel has enjoyed, meaning the IAF has to come up with solutions that can maintain its operational independence. To avoid potential incidents, Israel and Russia have set up a direct line between their militaries. Contrary to foreign reports, this is not a coordination mechanism, but one meant to prevent any clash between Israeli and Russian forces. This goes beyond semantics: Coordination means reporting on operations ahead of time, which is highly unlikely as this could result in intelligence leaks that could endanger both the operation and the pilots' lives. Preventing a clash, however, entails real-time updates on an ongoing operation, so as to prevent interception. This mechanism has proved itself twice before, under different circumstances, when Russian fighter jets accidently breached Israeli airspace while carrying out raids in southern Syria. They were detected and allowed to go on their way unharmed. This leads to the assumption that in the opposite circumstances -- should Israeli jets be detected by Russian radars -- they too will not be intercepted. This mechanism aims to avoid incidents like the downing of the Russian jet over Turkey in November 2015 on the one hand, while on the other hand it maintains the IAF's operational independence. It would be one thing if the Russians were concerned about the strikes attributed to Israel. But as long as their primary interest -- keeping Syrian President Bashar Assad's regime viable -- is not compromised, what happens to some obscure arms convoy is of no consequence to them. Syria and Hezbollah are also unlikely to retaliate. Assad and the Shiite terrorist group are far too busy fighting the long civil war that is ravaging the country to pursue a fresh round of unwanted hostilities opposite Israel. The one thing that should concern Israel is the publicity given to the alleged strike, including by Syria state media. Past operations of this nature were far more covert. It seems the other side wants to signal that it knows exactly what is going on. At this point, Syria is most likely only monitoring the situation. But Israel has to ask constantly whether something in the basic premise dictating Syrian policies has changed, so as to make sure Assad and Hezbollah do not become overly confident under the wings of Russian air defenses.
