The debate over the results of the Second Lebanon War, which began 10 years ago this week, ought to start with the bottom line. A decade after the fighting ended, there is no doubt that Israel's achievements in that war, however important, could have been accomplished at a much lower price. Hezbollah's removal from the border area and the deployment of the Lebanese army there, as well as new rules of the game that ensure peace along the border, were goals that could have been achieved without entangling Israel in a 33-day war, without putting the communities of northern Israel -- all the way to Haifa and Hadera -- under a barrage of rockets, and, most importantly, without paying such a heavy toll in human lives. Despite all that, the failed conduct of Israeli political and military leaders during the war did not mean it was an Israeli defeat. At most, it was a missed opportunity, particularly regarding public opinion and the exorbitant price paid for achievements that should not be taken lightly. Hezbollah, like Israel, also notched up achievements during the war, the most significant of which was its success in surviving the Israeli onslaught and launching rockets into Israel until the very last day of the war. Furthermore, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah was able to expose the gap between the rhetoric of Israeli leaders, including then-Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, who had promised to eliminate Hezbollah's military power and dismantle its rocket arsenal, and the practical inability to accomplish such far-reaching goals, particularly given Israel's reluctance to conduct ground operations in Lebanese territory. However, Hezbollah's success in surviving the war and its ability to inflict damage on Israel did not minimize the crippling blows it suffered at the hands of the IDF, with hundreds of dead Hezbollah fighters and the devastation of the Shiite community in southern Lebanon, Hezbollah's most loyal base of support. It seems the only lesson Hezbollah learned from the Second Lebanon War was how to better prepare for the next confrontation with Israel, if one comes. On the eve of the war, Hezbollah had an estimated 12,000 to 18,000 rockets in its arsenal. A decade later, the Shiite terrorist organization has around 100,000 rockets, some of which are long range and could strike anywhere in Israel. Unlike Israel, Nasrallah was quick to boast of the organization's achievements during the 2006 war, claiming a "historic" and "divine" victory over Israel. Nasrallah's ability to market this lie shows the profound differences between the Israeli public and Lebanon's Shiite community, which is backward but highly motivated, and where reality is replaced by imagination and every shred of self-criticism is suppressed. Yet, over the years, Nasrallah's proclamations of victory appearance turned out to be a false facade. Members of Lebanon's Shiite community have grumbled about the hefty price they were forced to pay. Also, despite being impressed with Hezbollah's ability to survive the blows it took from Israel, other key players in Lebanon's political arena remained steadfast in their determination to maintain their status against challenges posed by Hezbollah. The war also drew attention to Hezbollah's Shiite identity and its ties with Iran -- sensitive issues for the organization, which sought to present itself as the defender of all Arabs and Muslims. In this respect, the Second Lebanon War served as a preview for the Syrian civil war, which erupted in the spring of 2011 and brought everything to a screeching halt for Nasrallah. Hezbollah's involvement in Syria has claimed more than 1,000 lives among the organization's fighters and has stirred up animosity among Shiites in Lebanon. But given the radicalization of Islamic Salafi groups in Lebanon, who view Shiites as enemies deserving of death, Shiites have no choice but to continue seeking shelter behind Hezbollah. The Second Lebanon War is gradually becoming a distant memory, which is another reason for Nasrallah to repeat his apology for 2006. Had he known how things would unfold, Nasrallah would have never ordered the IDF soldier abduction operation that sparked the Second Lebanon War.
