Deal opponents driven by politics

The reconciliation deal with Turkey is marred only by one issue: the fact that the bodies of two fallen IDF soldiers from Operation Protective Edge were not returned. This issue will soon become a loud debate unless Egypt -- yes, Egypt has to do it -- forces Hamas to return the bodies of Hadar Goldin and Oron Shaul, who were killed in that operation. The cries of lamentation over their fate are not easy to hear, and it is a throwback to the heart-wrenching campaign in the years prior to the release captive Israeli soldier Gilad Schalit.

There is also the issue of the compensation Israel will pay to the families of the Turkish terrorists who took part in the 2010 Turkish-led flotilla. Justice was not served when Israel agreed to pay $20 million. In return, Israel gets to maintain its naval blockade of the Gaza Strip, while Turkey promised to stop Hamas from directing violent activity on Turkish soil. The deal may not be a pleasant site, but such arrangements are very common in international diplomacy.

There are real benefits in this deal. Lest we forget, Turkey is a regional powerhouse (albeit weakened) that has tried to intensify the boycott, divestment and sanctions campaign against Israel. This diplomatic maneuver gives Israel the legitimacy it so desperately needs. We must also keep in mind that Israel wants to fully maximize the potential of its natural gas fields in the Mediterranean Sea. The gas will fill up the state coffers when the necessary regulation is finalized.

Everyone in the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet knows that. The ministers opposing the deal have not cited the fate of the Israeli soldiers as the reason for their "No" vote. It appears, then, that they are opposed to the deal simply because they want to extract political mileage. This is the same old party politics, but this time cabinet votes are being scalped. When Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman says he is against the deal -- Education Minister Naftali Bennett and Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked feel compelled to voice their objections as well; when they do that -- the Likud ministers feel they have to do the same.

Make no mistake: those ministers do not want to derail the deal. Nor do they want to be held responsible for the diplomatic fallout that would ensue. The only reason they are against the deal is because it would boost their standing among their constituents, but only if their "no" vote is in the minority. It reminds me of the famous story about the late MK Moshe Sneh, who stayed in the Knesset cafeteria despite being told to go to the plenum and cast his vote on some bill. Sneh could not be bothered and continued sipping his tea. He then quipped, "Why should I go, my minority vote is secured-"

If Lieberman, Bennett, Shaked, Likud and Kulanu ministers only wanted to make political hay by opposing this deal, they should not have attended the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet meeting. Netanyahu could have spared himself this headache if he had brought the deal to the full cabinet and had all ministers vote on it. It would have been guaranteed to pass in that forum. After obtaining a majority, he could have gone to the Knesset and informed lawmakers of the green light he got from the cabinet.

We are in for some funny theatrics: Opposition Leader Isaac Herzog (Zionist Union) will speak against the deal; his internal party rival Shelly Yachimovich will speak for the deal, as will Tzipi Livni. It appears, then, that members of the opposition are also good at petty score-settling. But the plenum will eventually do what it always does: It will take note of the cabinet's decision that a deal has been reached.

Opting to take this deal to the full cabinet and then to the Knesset would have ensured that the deal had a solid majority and widespread backing. End of story.

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