The regional impact of normalization

In a cost-benefit analysis of the Israel-Turkey reconciliation deal, both countries benefit from the success of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in resolving their strained relationship and putting it back on track.

As in any diplomatic deal, there was compromise. Each side conceded certain things to the other. Israel apologized for the deaths of Turkish citizens but did not accept responsibility for the 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident -- instead it simply expressed regret for the end result. The compensation that Jerusalem is willing to pay Turkish victims of that incident is negligible when compared to the potential scope of economic benefits Israel could reap from renewed relations with Turkey. Turkey, for its part, has withdrawn all its initial diplomatic demands and is now willing to fully cooperate with Jerusalem, within the window that Israel has set for any international body interested in providing humanitarian aid to Gaza.

While the deal will not change any world order in the region, nor will it set off a honeymoon period between the two countries, there is no doubt that the diplomatic, security and economic benefits both countries will gain as a result of normalizing relations are worth so much more than the price of compromise.

It is equally important to take note of the big losers in this deal. This list includes Iran, Hezbollah and even Hamas, which failed in their efforts to turn the crisis between Jerusalem and Ankara into an unbridgeable rift and to turn the diplomatic tension into a cold war that could have devolved into political, economic or even military conflict. Ultimately, Israel succeeded in preventing this dangerous possibility.

In this context, it's important to note that, contrary to what most Israelis believe, Hamas is not in Ankara's pocket and does not blindly follow its dictates. Likewise, the fact that Hamas has representation in Moscow does not mean that Russian President Vladimir Putin is Hamas leader Khaled Mashaal's master. Ankara, Moscow and Riyadh are part of a system of political backing sought out by Hamas against which Israel must operate. All this means that Israel's ability to extract concessions from Hamas as part of the deal with Turkey was limited or non-existent to begin with. Therefore, any talks or negotiations with Hamas must be carried out directly or through a mediator. There is no logic in subordinating Israel's regional relationships to Mashaal and his fellow Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

This deal will not take Israel and Turkey back to the days of the strategic alliance that existed between them about two decades ago. But what it can do is redraw the familiar Middle Eastern lines, dividing those states and radical groups that share a common hatred for Israel and moderate states like Israel, Egypt and Turkey alongside Jordan and Saudi Arabia, which engage in strategic dialogue and even foster economic ties and security cooperation.

The need for understandings between Israel and Russia, Egypt and even Greece and Cyprus, may have delayed the deal, but they were essential to maintaining the regional balance of power. In fact, Russia, too, avoided cutting off relations with Ankara after a Russian plane was brought down by the Turkish army about a year ago; and Greece even has an operational embassy in the Turkish capital. In other words, the normalization of relations between Israel and Turkey is not a process likely to damage Jerusalem's ties with its old and new friends in the region.

Yes, Egypt still views Turkey as a bitter enemy and is not prepared to normalize relations with it, but even Cairo is willing to admit that the importance of the reconciliation deal between Israel and Turkey is less about Israeli-Turkish relations and more about Turkey. Turkey can no longer use the Israeli issue, in the name of Islam, to impose its will on the Arab and Muslim world. From now on, Turkey must be conscious of its limitations and its national interests, which often require restraint and pragmatism, and moreover, also commit it to dialogue with Israel.

טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו