Over the past few weeks, the world has been hearing near-daily reports of the blows dealt to the Islamic State group. In Iraq, government forces were able to make strides in Fallujah, about 50 kilometers west of the capital Baghdad. Taking Fallujah in 2014 was Islamic State's first step toward overrunning vast areas in Iraq and Syria, which it later declared the Islamic caliphate. In Syria, U.S.-backed Kurdish forces threaten to sever Islamic State's routes near the Turkish border, through which most of the jihadi group's foreign volunteers and supplies travel. Moreover, Syrian President Bashar Assad's forces -- Iranian and Hezbollah forces backed by Russia to be exact -- are making headway in central Syria, and are steadily advancing toward al-Raqqa, Islamic State's self-proclaimed capital in Syria. En route, they have also liberated the historic city of Palmyra, which Islamic State seized in 2015. There is little wonder then that U.S. officials, and many in Israel, have began touting the demise of Islamic State. Some have even gone as far as planning "the day after," including dividing Syria into autonomous provinces and spheres of influence between the nations fighting on the ground. One must remember however, that rumors of Islamic State's demise may be greatly exaggerated and may eventually turn out to be no more than wishful thinking. First, despite reports of breakthroughs in the war on Islamic State, the battles waged by the Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish forces against the jihadi group are advancing very slowly, and in many cases the troops are exhausted before they achieve their goals. The Iraqi, Syrian, and Kurdish forces' strikes are also mostly localized, and do not outline an overall campaign meant to seize back the areas overrun by Islamic State. At this time, such a feat seems more than these troops are able to deliver. The Iraqi army is not demonstrating impressive operational abilities, even under its American and Iranian advisers' supervision. Baghdad's forces have to rely on Shiite militias, for which this is not a national Iraqi battle, but rather an ethnic Shiite-Sunni conflict at best. At worst, they see it as an opportunity to settle scores and embark on looting sprees. It has to be said that in this respect, while any Iraqi-Shiite success brings Islamic State closer to its end, it also fuels the very Sunni-Shiite feud that facilitated the rise of the jihadi group in the first place, gaining it support from Iraqi Sunnis. In Syria, the strides made by the Kurdish forces or by Assad's army augment Sunni-Alawite and Kurdish-Arab tensions. The Kurds have limited abilities and seem uninterested in extending their fight beyond their territory. Assad's forces are exhausted, and it is doubtful they would be able to venture into and seize the heart of the Syrian desert and mimic the achievements the Egyptian army had in Sinai. Moreover, even if Islamic State loses its hold on some of its territory, it will remain active in the Syrian and Iraqi spheres, ingrained at the heart of Sunni communities feeling besieged by the Shiite-Kurdish-Alawite coalition leader the charge against the organization on the ground. Moreover, Islamic State's doctrine has struck a chord at the hearts of countless young Muslims worldwide, and its hold will not be easily broken. The bottom line is that it was not the rise of Islamic State that led to the collapse of the Iraqi and Syrian regimes. On the contrary -- those regimes' collapse and the escalating ethnic and sectarian tensions were what tore the ancient Iraqi and Syrian societies apart, thus facilitating the jihadi group's rise. It is not the eradication of Islamic State, but rather the restoration of Iraq and Syria as state-entities based on a wide consensus among their people, that will restore peace and stability to the region. But this goal, it seems, remains out of reach.
