Beware an undesired escalation

The discovery of a Hamas terror tunnel under the Israel-Gaza Strip border was hardly surprising. Since the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014, Hamas has allocated considerable resources -- staggering amounts of money and hundreds of operatives -- to rehabilitate and expand its tunnel grid, knowing Israel cannot meet this threat in full.

The underground passageway that was uncovered bore familiar characteristics: It was dug some 40 meters (130 feet) deep, about 1.5 meters (5 feet) wide, and ran several hundred yards into Israeli territory. Military professionals disagree on whether this is a new tunnel or an old one, dug prior to Protective Edge and simply expanded. This argument may have serious ramifications: If this is an old passageway, then the claim that Hamas' tunnel grid was destroyed in 2014 was false, and if this is a new tunnel, it proves Hamas is flouting Israel's warning that digging border-breaching tunnels would be cause for another war.

Quite a few politicians weighed in on the matter on Monday, including some who are privy to military intelligence and are therefore familiar not only with the information regarding this specific tunnel, but with the intelligence available on Hamas' overall plans for its offensive tunnel infrastructure.

Some politicians were quick to demand Israel launch a new military operation over the tunnels, but this amounts to nothing but empty rhetoric. Israel will not go to war over armament efforts, and much like on the northern borders, when it comes to the Gaza Strip, Israel prefers to generate deterrence and avoid a new round of hostilities as much as possible.

Hamas, for its part, seems to be on the same page. Gaza's rulers are trying to maneuver a strategic labyrinth, as they must try to rehabilitate an enclave crumbling under economic hardship and rising unemployment. Despite the notion that Hamas may have tighter control on the ground, one must remember that it was similar circumstances that drove Hamas to attack Israel in 2014, so military intelligence must be more vigilant than ever to spot any changes in Hamas' policy.

This is doubly important given statements made by top Israeli officials, suggesting Israel has developed the technological ability to counter the tunnel threat. These statements may have been premature, as while considerable progress has been made on this front, the technology available cannot counter the threat in full at this time.

Moreover, the main question is what Hamas infers from these statements. If the Hamas concludes that it better hurry up and make the most of whatever time it has left before its tunnel grid is exposed and destroyed, then Israel should brace itself for a fresh round of violence.

One must also remember that the situation in Judea and Samaria will also contribute to any development in Gaza. Hamas may be holding its operatives back in the south, but the same cannot be said for its operatives in Judea and Samaria, who are encouraged to carry out terrorist attacks.

If the investigation into Monday's bus bombing in Jerusalem proves Hamas was behind the attack and Israel decides to embark on a wide-scale arrests operation across Judea and Samaria -- as it did in June 2014 following the abduction and murder of three Israeli teens -- then Hamas may decide to strike the south.

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