Hamas' internal dilemma | היום

Hamas' internal dilemma

Residents of southern Israel, and the rest of the country for that matter, were left confused by the barrage of recent media reports concerning Hamas' future intentions. These reports told of Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades' accelerated armament efforts, steadily increasing number of operatives, and its infamous leader Mohammed Deif's power plays, aimed at making Hamas' military wing an independent entity in the Gaza Strip, one unburdened by Hamas' political wing's policies or preferences.

On the other hand, senior officials in the Israeli defense establishment were quick to underscore the bottom line, namely that Hamas' leadership in Gaza is not interested in a security escalation and that the Islamist group is committed to maintaining calm along the southern border, as it has been doing since the conclusion of Operation Protective Edge in the summer of 2014. Right now, IDF officials stressed, Hamas' top priority is ensuring its political survival.

The situation on the ground, however, remains tense and volatile. The Israel-Gaza Strip border does not enjoy the same peace and quiet as the northern borders have in the decade since the Second Lebanon War, the Syrian civil war notwithstanding.

The uncertainty of the situation on the Israel-Gaza Strip border is compounded by the occasional violent flare-up, infiltration attempts, and Hamas' efforts to bolster its military infrastructure and tunnel grid, which are offset by the Israel Defense Forces' operations along the border, including the occasional countermeasures inside Gaza.

Unlike the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades, Hamas' government in Gaza has no interest in pushing for a new round of violence, as the enclave has yet to recover from the blows it suffered in 2014. Moreover, unlike Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas has no air or sea ports to offer it support and supplies. On the contrary -- it has Egypt at its back, and Cairo's animosity toward Hamas outweighs even Israel's aversion to it, so while Israel constantly tries to find out what -- if at all -- is the alternative to Hamas' rule in Gaza, there is nothing Egypt wants more than to eradicate the Islamist group altogether.

Hamas' patrons are Turkey and Qatar, two moderate Sunni states which are hostile to Iran and hold dialogues with Israel. The pending Israeli-Turkish reconciliation also contributes to curtailing Hamas. Moreover, unlike Hezbollah, which has been able to convince the Lebanese people that a prolonged conflict with Israel does not affect their daily lives, every Palestinian knows the only way to end the misery in Gaza is to hold some sort of dialogue with Israel.

Hamas is not an organization whose leaders follow set hierarchy, nor do its leaders control every last operative on the ground. Internal Palestinian politics force Hamas to accept the existence of other organizations in the Gaza Strip, such as Islamic Jihad, which march to the beat of their own drums.

This kind of weakness on Hamas' part invites trouble, as its political wing urges restraint, while its military wing pushes for escalation. The cycle of violence between Israel and Gaza peaks every two or three years, and the conflict on the southern border almost always erupts in unforeseen and undesired ways, reflecting the dynamics on the ground.

One must also remember there is no real way to separate the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. A reality where Hamas maintains the calm on the southern border, but its operatives across Judea and Samaria agitate the situation on the ground, fans the kind of flames that will eventually ignite Gaza as well.

Israel's policy on Gaza should combine generating deterrence opposite the enclave's terrorist groups on the one hand, and bolstering the Palestinian economy on the other hand, so as to create public pressure on Hamas to remain committed to maintaining the calm, in the same manner as the government in Ramallah.

Israel should also strive to undercut Hamas' armament efforts, while ensuring that if another conflict erupts, the fighting will be shorter than 50 days, and will end with a favorable result for Israel within a handful of hours or days.

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