Sounds of war are rising from Riyadh and Ankara. Both countries are threatening to send forces into Syria as a counter-balance to the increasing Russian-Iranian presence there, undeterred by warnings that intervening militarily in this manner could cause friction with Iran and Russia and spark a regional -- and perhaps even global -- conflagration. Both the Saudis and Turks say the forces earmarked for deployment to Syria will only fight the Islamic State group -- which is, after all, a target of international consensus. No one is buying it though. Indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin also claims the Russians are in Syria to fight Islamic State. In the meantime, however, Russian planes are bombing anything that moves in Syria. Anything, that is, except Islamic State targets. Putin, as we know, entered Syria to save Syrian President Bashar Assad and defeat the rebels fighting against him, while the Saudis and Turks want to go to Syria for precisely the opposite purpose -- to salvage the Syrian revolution and topple Assad. The threats from Riyadh and Ankara came largely as a surprise, as these two countries have traditionally taken pains to avoid intervening in regional conflicts and refrained from sending military forces to fight beyond their own borders. On several occasions they have resorted to fiery rhetoric, particularly the Turkish government headed by President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but have always been careful not to entangle themselves or get bogged down in the region's wars. It appears, however, that a sense of imminent peril -- the Kurdish threat for Turkey and the Iranian-Shiite and Russian menace for both -- has forced them into taking unprecedented action. After all, the conflict in Syria is no longer local. It has been regional for quite some time now, between Shiite Iran and Sunni Arab states with Turkey at their side; but it has also been global, insofar as we can see Russia seeking to secure influence and hegemony. Under the auspices of this conflict, Iran has sought to enhance its influence in Iraq and recently in Yemen as well. The Kurds in Syria, meanwhile, are following the leadership of the underground Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) based in Turkey, and they are trying to seize entire swathes of territory in northern Syria along the Turkish border. The Saudis, under the helm of King Salman, a new and dynamic leader far bolder than his predecessor, have already taken the first steps to countering Iran's increasing influence in Yemen, and were willing to fight Iranian intervention among the Shiite population in Saudi Arabia, even at the cost of severing diplomatic ties with Tehran. Turkey, meanwhile, shot down a Russian fighter jet that had infiltrated its airspace, and in recent days it has begun attacking Kurdish forces in northern Syria. These Kurdish forces want to exploit the Russian-Iranian onslaught against the rebels, take control of the northern border area and establish autonomy there. Saudi Arabia and Turkey, two countries known for being extremely cautious, are not displaying this kind of resolve out of a position of strength. It is rather from weakness and distress, and the sense that they are alone against a growing threat to their national security. In the past they would lean on the United States and trust the protection it provided -- but now it seems they have lost their faith in Washington and have come to the conclusion that if they fail to act on their own behalf, no one will. The U.S., for its part, continues to stutter and vacillate. It is helping the Kurds in northern Syria while ignoring the support they also receive from the Russians and Iranians. Its conduct in regard to the Shiite militias in Iraq has been similar. For Turkey, the PKK and its branch in Syria are enemies of the state, responsible for numerous terrorist attacks against Turkish targets in recent decades. Despite everything, though, it is still hard to envision Turkey and Saudi Arabia sending military forces into Syria, thereby risking direct or indirect conflict with Russia and Iran, without NATO support and U.S. consent, both of which they are highly unlikely to receive. The ball, therefore, is back in Washington's court. Its friends in the region are hoping in vain for the U.S. to formulate a comprehensive regional policy in light of the crisis in Syria, and to provide an answer to the Iranian and Russian presence there and beyond. This, of course, is not to be expected, as Washington has given up on the Syrian crisis and is willing, for lack of a better option, to accept that the war there will persist until the very last Syrian falls.
