A dangerous policy of restraint

Iran has a finger in every pie in the Middle East today: In Syria it is with the Russians to save President Bashar Assad's regime; in Iraq, after receiving its certificate of legitimacy in the nuclear deal, it is with the Americans in the war against the Islamic State group. What would we do without Iran? Or maybe the bigger question is: What do we do with Assad-

Russia and Iran are positioning themselves for all to see as the Assad's saviors. The Syrian dictator's army is struggling against al-Qaida and Islamic State in the northwest and east, not to mention the other 157 jihadist groups active in the country. Since March, Assad has suffered nothing but military defeats at the hands of the jihadist coalition seeking his demise. This is not what the West had hoped for when riots erupted in Syria in March 2011. Those who dreamed of democracy found themselves with either fascism or jihadism.

The question now is what the West wants, beyond vanquishing Islamic State. Does it aspire to reach an arrangement in Syria, with or without Assad? The differences of opinion are not concealed, and this is perhaps what is saving Assad -- for the time being.

The Russians aren't hiding their desire to keep Assad in power. Their goal in Syria today is primarily defensive. They want to protect Assad and his Alawite tribe against a massacre and safeguard their maritime interests in the region.

The Iranians, on the other hand, are more interested in safeguarding the regime and less the man heading it. As far as they are concerned, a different puppet presiding in Damascus and obeying Tehran is probably not a bad solution.

The Saudis and Turks want Assad's head on a silver platter. Some say the Saudis would even be willing to accept Obama's nuclear guarantees in exchange for Assad's head. In Ankara, too, the Turks want to see a different tenant in the presidential palace in Damascus. In the West, however, the situation is exceedingly ambiguous. While French President Francois Holland, speaking at a press conference in Paris this week, said the new Syria must be Assad-free, the British foreign minister said he saw a possibility for Assad to remain in power during a transition period.

The big question today is what the Americans want. Presumably, they would like to see Assad go, but officials in Washington are worried about the day after. The Libyan model frightens them. In Libya after Moammar Gadhafi's demise they received 50 shades of warring tribes. But in Syria after Assad they will receive 50 shades of jihad.

U.S. President Barack Obama essentially drew an (imaginary) red line forbidding Assad from using chemical weapons. Assad ignored the American president more than once, and used those weapons against his people in the summer of 2013. Obama could have gone to war against Assad, which would have at least upheld a modicum of ethical integrity, but he preferred to let it go. In the Middle East, Assad and his adversaries interpreted this as American weakness.

Meanwhile, the Americans are fighting Islamic State but are simultaneously sending an unclear message about Assad's future. The Russians, however, are being very clear: They very much want to keep him in power. They want to fight Islamic State and also save Assad, which translates quite well to the battlefield. There is no doubt the Russians are coming to hamper the Americans in the Middle East, as they did in the Soviet era -- perhaps, in addition, because of the American vacuum that has been created.

If anyone wants to understand American policy in Syria, they are invited to read an article published by Fox News on Thursday, in which an American official is asked what the U.S. will do to counter Russia's military buildup in Syria. The answer was: "Nothing."

From a moral perspective, Assad has no right to exist. He lost that right long ago. Now the question remains: Does the survival of his regime preserve stability? Firstly, morally speaking, that question doesn't even need to be asked. But if we insist on answering it regardless, we will arrive at the conclusion that the division of Syria, the Russian arrival on the scene, the strengthening of jihadist groups (especially Islamic State) and the migration of refugees only prove the extent to which Assad is failing to provide the goods, otherwise known as stability.

The choice today in Syria is between bad and worse. This is already not encouraging. We can assume the Syrian crisis will continue for quite a while. This is a war between two evil sides, which has turned Syria into a type of Afghanistan.

And the Americans? They are doing what's most comfortable for them: lethargically bombing from the air.

טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו