Under normal circumstances, without a budget battle raging in the background, the "IDF Strategy" document would never have seen the light of day because of its content -- and if it had been revealed, it would immediately have become the center of media and public attention. But in days such as these -- with the Locker report pitted against the army's own multiyear plan -- nothing is normal, which is why the report was released, almost silently, as if IDF officials sought to show they were simply fulfilling their duty of "transparency" by reporting to the public. The truth of course is more complicated. The published document is a message to government ministers, essentially saying: This is our response to the threats Israel is facing. If you back it up with the budget, we can meet these challenges. Putting this message aside, what we have is one of the more organized and serious documents written here in decades. In the document, written under directives from Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, the Israel Defense Forces lays down the operational groundwork with a series of objectives and targets for times of routine, emergency and war, and commits to "successfully completing every mission and meeting every challenge and realizing its purpose -- to defend and to be victorious." The document identifies the threats (less conventional threats posed by states, an increased threat posed by organizations like Hezbollah and Hamas, and threats to cybersecurity and the homefront). It addresses the mobilization and use of force (along with the Ben-Gurionesque definition of "deterrence, alert, resolution" we now have "defense" and "victory"), and it discusses military structure (the only place in the document pertaining to a crisis of resources, which requires they be utilized to their fullest, along with a warning that a certain critical mass of resources is required in order to ensure the desired results). Due to their classified nature, figures pertaining to the sizes and number of units and resources were intentionally removed from the document. Also erased from the censored version is Iran. And although the document does mention it as the main state sponsor of terrorism and instability in the region, it does not address the issue most troubling to Israel -- its nuclear program. It's safe to assume that the uncensored version is more detailed, but in regards to the nuclear deal between Iran and global powers the IDF speaks openly without mentioning names, referring only to "a country without a shared border" in which "clandestine and classified actions will be carried out, up to and including an attack against the enemy's efforts to enhance its strength ... which will disrupt and thwart its plans and intentions." It also mentions "intelligence ... with which to deliver a preemptive blow" and "the preemptive strike capabilities ... to prevent an attempt at harming Israel." In regards to other threats, the IDF is more detailed. The document clearly lays out multiple goals that includes tens of thousands of identified targets in Lebanon (for comparison's sake: the IDF entered the Second Lebanon War with just over 200 pre-identified targets) and thousands of targets in Gaza as well as the ability to maneuver land forces and conduct a campaign on multiple fronts simultaneously; it also emphasizes the need to "win," minimize the damage to the homefront, preserve legitimacy and ensure a better security situation the day after. The document also presents clear demands from the political echelon -- to define what is expected of the IDF in its normal routine, and in an emergency: to provide a complete military victory or to settle for partially hurting the enemy (similar to the Second Lebanon War and the recent campaigns in Gaza). This is supposedly nothing new, yet regardless -- the IDF is assuming responsibility but is asking the leadership for clear directives and, should the worst arise, to share in that responsibility.
