The best and the brightest might go

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yohanan Locker found himself in a heart-wrenching situation yesterday: he, who served in the military for over three decades -- primarily in combat roles -- found himself in the position of the enemy and was asked to swear his allegiance. "The IDF is dear to my heart," he declared, in an attempt to throw off the label of "traitor" that the defense establishment pinned on him.

In Locker's defense, we can say the Israel Defense Forces is indeed no less dear to him than it is to all the others who have, in the past few days, talked about its demise. But he deserves most of the criticism. A significant portion of his committee's conclusions are reasonable, and more than that -- almost entirely in line with the IDF's plans. What sparked the battle over the eponymous report was his contrarian approach. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot has not met with Locker since he was appointed; Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon had only one two-hour meeting with him, and when he asked for another one encountered evasiveness. The IDF had to beg (and eventually demand) an advance copy of the report for review. A person who announces that he is only thinking of the good of the army should be expected to behave otherwise. It's possible that cooperation would have bridged most of the points of dispute or at least minimized the damage caused.

On Tuesday, Locker asked that the way in which the report was compiled and presented not be the matter of discussion, only its essence. When it comes down to it, most of the report's recommendations are necessary. The most obvious one pertains to transparency: Locker is right when he claims that in 2015 the Defense Ministry and the IDF have an obligation of transparency (except for sensitive operational matters). But his claim is weakened when we remember who is on the other side -- the Finance Ministry, which year after year refuses to answer the simple question of how much money the budget has in reserve. This incongruence, and the military's sense that the Treasury is not seeking to know so much as to control, shake his statement and could scupper the needed move.

The basis for two other main recommendations in the report also raises a difficulty: pensions for career officers and a shortened compulsory service. The IDF argues that the decision to cut mandatory military service to two years is an unprofessional proposal because the army's manpower cannot be cut by a third in so short a time, and that the decision creates not only a high security risk but also a need to compensate for the lack of soldiers by calling up more reserve personnel at a much higher cost.

The potential danger of reducing pensions is that it could cause talented officers to resign from the military, leaving the less capable. Locker has no clear answer to this issue nor to the justified claim that the IDF is being treated unfairly compared to other parts of the security apparatus, that it has gone from an army that offered conditions everyone wanted to an army that offers less benefits than the Fire and Rescue Services or the Israel Prisons Service.

Ya'alon is convinced that the report's failings are so serious that there is no chance it will be adopted. The IDF is less convinced, and has launched an intensive -- almost violent -- public relations campaign that has only increased the confusion of the public and its elected representatives. In any case, the decision is in the hands of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who is keeping mum. By doing so he keeps the matter open for exploration, which could eventually torpedo the report, but cause unnecessary damage along the way to those whom the commission rightfully called the best and the brightest.

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