For whatever reason, U.S. President Barack Obama has had another falling out with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Exactly what precipitated this is immaterial, since their relationship was rocky to begin with. The troubled state of affairs is mostly Netanyahu's fault. He insisted on addressing Congress in early March, he walked back his pledge to support a two-state solution, and he lashed out against the Arabs who were "being shuttled in droves to the ballot box." Most Israelis would disagree with my analysis and say Obama is to blame. But this worthy debate will ultimately be settled by historians. The post-election analysis should not overlook the issue of Palestinian statehood. Despite his campaign rhetoric, upon reelection Netanyahu said he was in favor of a two-state solution in principle. But the White House has remained unconvinced. Back in the day, the White House would accept Netanyahu's explanations, even if it had lingering doubts, because it wanted to reignite the peace process. What can we deduce from this behavior? That the administration has forgone the option of mending fences, that it does not seek reconciliation. Perhaps it seeks the exact opposite. If relations were to go back to square one, the U.S. would once again have to veto U.N. Security Council resolutions that give "Palestine" statehood and full-fledged U.N. membership. When MK Zeev Elkin was deputy foreign minister he sounded the alarm on this issue. He warned of the severe repercussions of a successful statehood bid at the U.N. If such resolutions pass, he said, Israel would be viewed as an occupier of a neighboring U.N. member state that is on par with other nations. Let's assume Obama does not want to mend fences with Netanyahu (at least not now). If this is true, then Israel must find ways to defuse tensions so as to successfully weather the storm. Perhaps this policy will fail to provide a lasting remedy, but it will nevertheless serve as a pain reliever of sorts. There is one tried and tested method: announcing that the 2009 Bar-Ilan speech is official Israeli policy. Would Netanyahu's emerging coalition partners accept such a move as a cabinet resolution or as a watered-down executive order? I doubt it. There is also the old-new risk that Obama would do what Secretary of State James Baker did in the 1990s. Baker threatened then-Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir with a simple formula: A dollar spent on settlement construction is one dollar less in American foreign aid. This is what he called fungibility, and it might once again be applied if Israel continues to withhold Palestinian Authority funds. We might see America deduct the amount Israel owes PA President Mahmoud Abbas from the foreign aid (although Obama will struggle to bring Congress on board). Israel must navigate the waters with caution. Perhaps we should unfreeze the funds and send them over to Abbas. Until then, we must send messengers to the kind souls in American -- where powerful Jews are constantly expressing concern in telephone calls to Israel -- and ask that they hold off on taking any steps until after Israel's new government is sworn in.
