The emerging nuclear agreement between world powers and Iran is in the same category as another agreement having to with our region, signed by the U.S. in the summer of 2013 -- the agreement to disarm Syria of chemical weapons. At the time, the administration characterized that deal as a dramatic achievement and a success, but in retrospect it will go down in history as a deal that may have afforded the Obama administration the appearance of calm for the short term and possibly treated a symptom of the problem, but failed to root out the problem itself -- the continued rule of the murderous regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. A straight line can be drawn between these two agreements, both reflecting the administration's refusal to take the necessary responsibility to punish rogue regimes for crimes against their own people or their neighbors, or to root out a threat to the region and possibly to the entire world. Washington is understandably fed up with dealing with the world's problems. The U.S. is exhausted after its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and up to its neck in domestic problems. But in our current reality perhaps it would have been best to simply admit the bitter truth and leave it exposed, rather than to create a false impression of a solution. That way no one would be surprised when the problem -- be it the Iranian nuclear ambition or the murderous nature of the Syrian regime -- resurfaces a few years down the line, and perhaps sooner, in a far more dangerous configuration than before. When Assad used chemical weapons on a civilian population near the Syrian capital two years ago, it was not the first such instance. But the high number of casualties -- more than 1,200 -- and particularly the firsthand accounts from the scene, left no doubt regarding what had happened, and left the administration no choice but to respond. It is safe to assume that U.S. President Barack Obama did not want to be pulled into a military campaign in Syria. But only months earlier, Obama had publicly warned Assad that the use of chemical weapons would signify a serious line crossing and elicit an assured response. Apparently Obama had hoped that Assad would get the message and that he would never have to make good on his threat, but Assad naturally assumed that Obama was bluffing, putting Obama in a position of having no choice but to respond. Obama's response, however, was not designed to help the Syrian people, but rather to save face with the American public and the world. The Russians rushed to Obama's and the Syrians' aid, coming up with an agreement under which Washington would refrain from punishing Assad for the chemical massacre if Assad would disarm. This agreement was touted as a historic and dramatic achievement, but most people were all too comfortable ignoring its many weaknesses, namely the fact that it provided Assad with immunity from any international or American strike as long as he upheld the terms of the deal, thereby giving Syria a green light, albeit indirect, to continue using every type of weapon save chemical weapons on the rebels. Another problem with the deal was that it sent a clear message to the Syrian people that no one would be stepping in to help the Syrian revolution. Thus, the agreement inadvertently backed Assad in his fight against the rebels. Incidentally, it is rather obvious that if Assad survives the civil war in his country and remains in power, one of the first things he will do once it is over is to resume manufacturing and amassing chemical weapons, and possibly even nuclear weapons, as he has tried in the past. The emerging agreement with Iran is no different than the agreement between Washington and the Assad regime. It gives the Iranian regime immunity from future military strikes and communicates a problematic message to Iran's neighbors and to Israel that they cannot rely on the international community to help curb future Iranian aggression. Moreover, it takes Iran off the hook for past violations of agreements and international conventions, committed by essence of the very existence of Iran's nuclear program. To top it all off, it fails to solve the Iranian nuclear threat, but merely delays it by a few years.
