Thinking on our feet
Iran and Hezbollah's decision to open a united front against Israel in the Golan Heights was the product of their disappointment from Hamas' weakness during Operation Protective Edge, wages in the Gaza Strip over the summer, and the failed attempts by Palestinians in Judea and Samaria to carry out acts of violence, as well from the political difficulties of operating Hezbollah from Lebanon.
Iran has founded a special unit to attack Israel. Prince Jihad Mughniyeh, son of Hezbollah military commander Imad Mughniyeh, who was allegedly killed by Israel in 2008, was named to head this unit, which landed him the opportunity to have his picture taken with the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran before he was even 25 years old. Iran and Hezbollah have exempted all those involved in the project from the routine fighting alongside Syrian President Bashar Assad's troops.
For over a year, the unit assumed it was were operating under the Israeli radar. Its intention was to build a base of operations for a small, yet efficient force that would carry out attacks against Israel, using anti-tank missiles, rockets, snipers, and perhaps even infiltrate the Israeli border to abduct soldiers and attack Israeli communities.
On Sunday, the day of the strike in the Quneitra region, near the Israel-Syria border, the unit's commanders left Damascus to visit key positions along the border. Someone spotted them and made a quick decision that this was the chance to target them. This was not just the elimination of the unit's commanders, but a strategic targeted assassination. The operation was successful -- perhaps even too successful.
Israel has remained mum on the matter, while foreign media sources attributed the strike to the Israeli Air Force. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon -- whose soldiers were recently rescued from a deadly attack by Syrian rebels by Israel -- pointed at the IDF as responsible for the attack. One thing is clear: If Israel did eliminate the new unit's commanders, then the government had already made that decision several months ago, prompting Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon to consult with IDF Chief of General Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, IAF commander Maj. Gen. Amir Eshel, and Military Intelligence head Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi on the matter, and devise an operation.
The operation could have unfolded according to two possible scenarios: A specific strike against the commanders of the new unit, as was the case in the killing of Imad Mughniyeh; or knowing that several operatives was out in the field and therefore a successful operation would require immediate action, as was the case, apparently, in the killing of Jihad Mughniyeh. The rest is anybody's guess.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו