According to various reports, Israel targeted Jihad Mughniyeh and his convoy north of Quneitra just before he was to perpetrate an attack on the Syrian-Israeli border. But the killing also served another purpose. It showed that Israel is determined not to let Hezbollah and Iran take over the border area. If they could have their way, they would turn the Golan Heights into a stronghold and a staging ground for future attacks. It will have become what southern Lebanon was until the Second Lebanon War in 2006. Hezbollah, which has been actively involved in the raging civil war in Syria, views the Golan Heights as fertile ground for more attacks against Israel. The way it sees it, the area can serve as an alternative flash point to the Lebanese border, which lies in close proximity to pro-Hezbollah Shiite towns. The organization has thousands of operatives in Syria. Several hundred of them lost their lives fighting alongside Syrian President Bashar Assad's forces last year. Hezbollah and Iran have a strategic goal: preserving Assad's regime. This is of even greater priority than maintaining the struggle against israel. After all, Syria serves as Iran's conduit for the Hezbollah-bound weapon systems and funds. If Assad were to fall, the Islamic State group would reach the Lebanese heartland and pose an existential threat to Hezbollah and its Shiite allies there. By putting bubble wrap around Assad, Hezbollah chief Hassan Nasrallah has exposed his organization's Achilles' heel. And this is probably why he has yet to retaliate for the Israeli airstrike, as he fears an all-out confrontation. The next war between Israel and Hezbollah will resemble the 2006 Second Lebanon war and maybe even last summer's Gaza war. But the scope of destruction and the number of dead will probably be greater. Nasrallah would like to avoid a war because his Shiite constituencies will suffer in any such confrontation. That said, the organization is known for its provocations and over the years, it has often resorted to brinkmanship because it assumed it could withstand any war that would be triggered by such behavior. So goes its logic: Even if thousands or even tens of thousands of homes are destroyed throughout the fighting, the organization will have not buckled. This was the case in 2006, when the Israeli aircraft destroyed the Hezbollah-dominated Dahiyeh district but did not destroy Hezbollah. Similarly, the destruction in the 2014 conflict in Gaza did not bring an end to Hamas. In that sense, Assad's demise could become a game changer. Whether or not he falls could determine the fate of the next Israel-Hezbollah flare-up. If it so chooses, Israel could oust him. It is not a complicated thing to do, as his regime is already in tatters. It would suffice to block access to the Damascus International Airport to achieve that goal. The airport supplies Iran and Hezbollah with the oxygen they need to survive in the Levant, but it also serves as the regime's lifeline to the outer world. Targeting the airport would deal a crushing blow to Assad. But that is only one of several options. A conflict where Assad is no longer in the game, would be unlike any other conflict with Hezbollah. It would not end in a bloody draw and destruction on both sides. It would result with a crippled Nasrallah. And unlike in 2006, he would not be able to emerge from his bunker and claim that he outsmarted Israel with the help of divine intervention. With no backing from the Syrian regime, Nasrallah would find himself at a severe disadvantage, in part because he would see an influx of Syrian rebels -- led by the Islamic State group -- inundating Lebanon. These insurgents would be bent on exacting revenge from the Shiites. Denying Hezbollah its Syrian oxygen would hurt the organization's efforts to lay its hands on more weapons systems and may bring an end to the Hezbollah-bound arm shipments. Nasrallah knows that. So do the Iranians. Hence, the dilemma they face. As far as decision makers in Beirut and Tehran are concerned, the retaliation for Sunday's airstrike should present a significant challenge to Israel but leave their darling, Assad, unharmed. Perhaps Nasrallah and Iran have reassured themselves that Israel prefers Assad in power than having the Nusra Front or the Islamic State group rule over Syria. This approach was reinforced during the summer, when Israel decided to forgo a regime change in the Gaza Strip during Operation Protective Edge, fearing more radical elements would fill the vacuum.
