Unnecessary war of words
Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon found himself embroiled in two political battles on Tuesday, one justified, the other completely unnecessary.
The first saw Ya'alon put an end to the rumors that former GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. (res.) Yoav Galant was being seriously considered as the next IDF chief of staff.
Ya'alon has no interest in seeing Galant become the 21st military chief, and it is still unclear whether his statement to that effect was made with the backing of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, or simply as a way to present Netanyahu with a given fact.
The decision falls well under Ya'alon's purview. Just as Galant was once favored for the position by Netanyahu and former Defense Minister Ehud Barak -- only to have his candidacy derailed by senior officers at then-IDF Chief Gabi Ashkenazi's office -- there is no room to name him to the position now, when the defense minister feels he cannot work with him.
The defense minister's personal view of the chief of staff may not be reason enough to reject or promote a certain candidate, but a good working relationship between the two is a prerequisite. Regardless of whether Ya'alon acted wisely, the defense minister reserves the right to name the military chief, in coordination with the prime minister, and that is as it should be.
The second battle, which saw Ya'alon face off with Habayit Hayehudi Chairman Naftali Bennett, opened old wounds, although the clash was probably inevitable.
This argument involves former Chief Military Rabbi Brig. Gen. (res.) Avichai Rontzki. While no one disputes the fact that Rontzki has earned his stripes, which date back to his days in the Paratroopers Brigade, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz was still right to remove him from service. But there was no need to humiliate Rontzki by making the whys and wherefores of it public.
If -- as Ya'alon alluded -- Rontzki had leaked information to Bennett regarding would-be counter-tunnel operations, than the military rabbi certainly erred, but let's keep things in perspective. It may be wrong for a senior military officer to share sensitive information with a cabinet member, but it is not extremely unreasonable. However, if we learn that religious officers routinely leaked information to Bennett in what could be perceived as an organized fashion, that would be very serious.
Bennett denied the allegations and was furious over the affront to Rontzki. Bennett toured the area where three Israeli teenagers were murdered in June, and he understood what was said to him in military briefings. He urged Netanyahu and Ya'alon to target terror tunnels, but they preferred to try and bring the fighting in Gaza to an end without a ground operation. Once terrorists surfaced from a tunnel near Kibbutz Sufa, however, Netanyahu and Ya'alon immediately ordered Gantz to eradicate the tunnels.
The tunnels running under Israel's southern communities represented a psychological crisis, but they never posed a strategic threat. The belated ground operation was unpopular, but it demonstrated operational responsibility -- even if in hindsight Bennett was proved right.
Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin hesitated to order Operation Entebbe in 1976, knowing he would shoulder the responsibility for the outcome. He may have lagged behind his defense minister, Shimon Peres, but this was to his credit, even if Peres was proved right. The circumstances today are similar.
This, however, has launched a verbal world war, with Bennett now demanding a commission of inquiry and the coalition rattled once again. With Hamas threatening to renew its rocket fire at Israel should talks fail, this was simply unnecessary.
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