The past few weeks have seen Washington demonstrate the kind of determination not seen since U.S. President Barack Obama first entered the White House. After months -- years, really -- of hesitation, the United States now seeks to convince its allies and enemies alike in the Middle East, and with them the rest of the world, that this time the White House is serious about dealing the Islamic State group a crippling blow that will prevent it from forming an Islamic caliphate in Syria and Iraq. The U.S. is right to take action, even if said action is somewhat late, and at this point somewhat little. The Islamic State group poses a clear and present danger to American interests in the region, and it is only a matter of time before the group sets its sights on targets on American soil, as al-Qaida did before it. Resolute American action is also needed because there is a general distrust in the Middle East -- and beyond -- that the Obama administration is actually capable of taking decisive action against the group. This notion is based on the fact that from the moment he was inaugurated, Obama has sought to minimize any U.S. involvement in the Middle East, especially any direct military involvement. U.S. troops pulled out of Iraq, Washington made sure to lead from behind when a European coalition formed to act in Libya, the U.S. sought ways to negotiate with Iran, and the Obama administration did everything it could to refrain from military action in Syria, even after President Bashar Assad used chemical weapons against his own people, fearing that putting boots on the ground would drag the U.S. into a regional quagmire. Some in the U.S. and in the West are impressed by Obama's actions, but most in the Middle East do not share their enthusiasm. Islamic State itself is unimpressed by the U.S.'s threats, and it continues to boast of its power in what has become a weekly horror show featuring the decapitation of Western journalists. The fact that it is also killings scores of locals in the areas it overruns has already been completely sidelined. The logic upon which Islamic State has formed its strategy is terrifyingly simple: It believes Obama's rhetoric to be empty threats, and like many before it in the Middle East, it finds the U.S.'s hesitation, the administration's wariness of criticism, and the hurdles any democratic regime must face before taking action against terrorist organizations, far more interesting. More importantly, however, is the fact that every decapitation video that goes viral seems to boost Islamic State's recruitment numbers, as well as the support it gets from its sponsors. While terrorizing those it encounters into submission is key to the Islamic State group's strategy, those volunteering to join it do so out of more than fear -- they seem to do so out of a misplaced sense of pride in what appears to be the Arab answer to the West's hubris, or Islam's revenge after the wrongs of the West. There is no doubt that the majority of Arabs and Muslims are appalled by Islamic State's brutality, but the moderates are not the group's target audience. It sets its sights on fringe youths, those on the sideline of Arab and European societies who flock to its ranks by the hundreds and allow it, at the very least, to maintain its power. The lack of outspoken reservation against Islamic State among many in the Arab world also explains the problems the U.S. has been having in convincing leading Arab nations to join the coalition against it. The relations between many Arab states and the United States are steeped in distrust, and given the cold shoulder Washington had shown Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sissi, there is little wonder as to why Cairo has yet to rush to Washington's side. Moreover, the Arab nations are perceived as those whose role in the fight against Islamic State is that of cannon fodder, as they are expected to provide the boots on the ground. As long as the U.S. stands idly by or limits its actions to aerial strikes, and as long as Islamic State does not post a direct threat to Saudi Arabia or Jordan, the latter two have no reason to place their troops in its way, exposing themselves to external and internal perils alike.
