Two-thirds of our leading trio -- the two not in uniform -- launched the final leg of a battle for public opinion concerning Protective Edge. In a heavy dose of TV interviews, Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, followed by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, conveyed a message of operational success. Protective Edge is a success story because the Israel Air Force kept the army from having to launch a painful ground incursion into the heart of Gaza City; because Hamas was left with a depleted rocket arsenal; because former Defense Minister Amir Peretz and former Prime Minister Ehud Barak -- and at a later stage, Netanyahu, who significantly stocked Iron Dome munitions -- made the decision to neutralize the effectiveness of Hamas' long-range missiles; because when the miscalculation of the tunnel threat became apparent, Ya'alon and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz deployed a precise dose of infantry, overwhelming the tunnels and then withdrawing the troops fast enough so as not to become sitting ducks; because all of Hamas' demands fell apart when faced with Israel's unflinching line throughout convoluted negotiations in Cairo; because Israel did not break the rules with either Egypt or the Palestinian Authority. There is no such thing as a free war. There was an error of judgment regarding how poised the residents of the Gaza periphery were prepared to be, and Israel was dragged into an unnecessary confrontation with the United States (the opposite is true, as well). But, all things considered, the cost-benefit analysis weighs heavily on the benefits end. Despite the determination, responsibility, might and discretion demonstrated by Netanyahu, Ya'alon and Gantz, Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman told Channel 1's Ayala Hasson on Saturday something awfully vague, along the lines of it would be possible to seize the Gaza Strip without having to occupy it, and to force out Hamas without having to fight bloody urban battles Gaza-wide. It's not a convincing argument. But Lieberman had a true case, which he has stuck by for many years, while Netanyahu, once his partner, changed his tune. It is a weak spot that bears heavily on Netanyahu, though not on Ya'alon, which is why the defense minister launched much louder and clearer criticisms against the cabinet ministers who publicly shamed Netanyahu and Ya'alon's decision-making. It was here that Netanyahu faltered in his response. Rather than maintaining the claim that his mind remained unchanged upon becoming prime minister (as he said during an interview with Dana Weiss and Udi Segel), he should have stated that after sobering up and maturing politically, he realized such objectives could not be met with one operation alone, but only through a gradual process. It would have freed him from having to defend what happened, and it would have tipped the scales in his favor, showing he never lost sight of the goal. Rather, he merely slowed things down in achieving it. All in all, it appears as though Economy and Trade Minister Naftali Bennett, Lieberman, and Communication Minister Gilad Erdan believed it necessary to fast-track to the ultimate goal of temporarily seizing Gaza and ousting Hamas. But Netanyahu, Ya'alon and Gantz promised the public something else entirely. What they promised, they delivered, both politically and militarily. As a result, Likud's internal battle has been temporarily staved off. The political war between Netanyahu and the Right will stay at low-intensity. The salient problem facing him now comes from another direction altogether -- from Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and the Opposition, from friendly nations -- and that is the resumption of the peace process. Netanyahu should accept the offer now, with smiles and handshakes, instead of two months down the line, under conditions whose rhetorical fashion will be, in a word, acidic.
There is something quite tedious about recent attempts to undermine their accomplishments. They consistently reminded us that the Israel Defense Forces would need 50 days, yet many have continued to reject the notion that this was the amount of time necessary to ensure a death toll of 71 (a grievous number, as is), rather than 500, or 700.
