The aftermath of Operation Protective Edge can be seen among the top political echelon. Only two days have passed since the cease-fire took effect, and the way forward is unclear. The cabinet is still preoccupied with what the cease-fire actually means and with the political tussles that accompanied the 50 days of fighting, but in the international arena, the domino effect is already boiling. Khaled Mashaal, the standout loser of the Hamas leadership, tried to re-grab the reins in a speech he gave in Qatar. His remarks that the weapons his organization has in Gaza are sacrosanct and he would not enter to demilitarize the Strip did not surprise anyone. The United States submitted a proposal to the U.N. Security Council that was based on clearing Gaza of Hamas' weapons, but then it checked itself. The reason is still unknown, but there is strong suspicion that the Americans gave into pressure from Qatar -- influenced by Mashaal -- to delete any mention of demilitarizing the Strip from their proposal. Israel is demanding demilitarization, but from the start of the operation knew it wouldn't happen in the foreseeable future if Mashaal is speaking for his organization, and if the leadership in the Strip doesn't overrule him like it did when it decided to accept the cease-fire, because then there will not be any real negotiations for building a seaport or an airport. Demilitarization is linked to the 1993 Oslo Accords. No demilitarization? No port. Hamas in Gaza will pay the price in the quality of life and well-being of its citizens. A possibility like this already seems to be on the way. But Israel has a strong interest in improving Gazans' quality of life. Destroying the tunnels and blocking Qatari funds (for now) increase the need for economic intervention that will compensate the Palestinians for lost sources of income such as the underground digging initiative. Qatar has lost millions on the tunnels. The poor of Gaza made a living from the megalomaniacal insanity. Now they will be even poorer. They need an alternative. The key to understanding the future situation lies in the relationship that develops between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Rumors are being refuted one after the other, first that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu met with Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Amman (it seems he didn't) and then the PA leader's statements on Thursday that Netanyahu had already agreed to a state according to the 1967 borders. These are all trial balloons, and they demonstrate that Israel and the PA are sending out feelers ahead of implementing the cease-fire. The practical significance will be the deployment of Abbas' people at the Rafah and Kerem Shalom crossings. Hamas will excuse its assent, which stemmed from its own weakness, as an expression of the existence of a Palestinian unity government. In practice, it does not want Abbas' representatives on the border for fear that the PA will once again enter the Strip. But the common interest of the triangle comprised of Israel, Egypt, and the PA cannot overcome the traditional dissent among the three. The current belief is that the Americans and the Egyptians will press Israel to be generous to Abbas. The Right wing of the government, which squabbled with Netanyahu during the operation, will not allow him to ease up on Abbas, even if doing so is both desirable and necessary, and all that's being discussed is a temporary freeze in settlement construction, nothing more. The subject of the arguments will change. The disagreement between Netanyahu and his rivals in the government remains the same as ever.
