The dust has yet to settle on the fighting in the Gaza Strip and Israel has already found itself preoccupied with the mounting tensions on the Syrian border. For three and a half years Israel has been able to refrain from being dragged into Syria's bloody civil war, but no more.
Those who thought Syrian President Bashar Assad was the devil incarnate may soon miss him. Al-Qaida has reached the Israel-Syrian border, and it seems that hostilities are just a matter of time.
Syrian Ambassador to the U.N. Bashar Jaafari said as much on Thursday. Had the U.N. helped Syria two years ago, the Islamic State group (ISIS) would not have ended up with the, he rebuked. It was quite the cynical statement to make by the envoy of a regime that has so far butchered nearly 200,000 of its own people. Still, Jaafari was not completely wrong.
The international community has been so eager to oust Assad it has closed its eyes to the nature of the alternative, effectively allowing global jihad to overrun parts of Iraq and Syria through two of its offshoots: the "moderate" Jabhat al-Nusra, and its radical sibling ISIS, which has since completely splintered off al-Qaida.
At the moment, ISIS is too busy with eastern Syria to concern itself with Israel, and the terrorists who seized control of the Quneitra border crossing with Israel, on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights, were Jabhat al-Nusra operatives, collaborating with several secular rebel groups.
Over the past two years, Syrian rebel groups have taken over much of the buffer zone between the two borders, and they are now close to expelling Assad's army from the sector. It seems it is only a matter of time before Jabhat al-Nusra overruns the entire area, and when it does it will sever ties with its secular partners and set their sights on Israel.
Luckily, Military Intelligence has been following the developments closely and it has prepared the Israel Defense Forces for the fact that in all likelihood, the sector that has been mostly peaceful for the past 40 years, will soon heat up.
The IDF has prepared an operational and tactical response in the form of creating a new division and setting up a significant physical obstacle that is supposed to make it harder for Syrian-based terrorist to attack Israel.
Still, this is only a partial answer, as the challenge poses many questions, such as, for example, whom Israel should target in retaliation for mortar fire on one of the kibbutzim adjacent to the northern border.
The strategic dilemma is even greater. Assad is a familiar enemy and his regime is part of the axis of evil that begins in Iran and ends with Hezbollah in Lebanon. In the choice between potentially dealing with the Syrian Army or with al-Qaida -- or for that matter, between Hezbollah and ISIS -- Assad is the lesser evil.
No definitive solutions
This brings us back to the Gaza Strip and the understanding that there are no definitive solutions to modern wars. Hamas is one of Israel's archenemies, but if Operation Protective Edge has succeeded in undermining and deterring it, its regime in Gaza is better than the alternative of seeing the Strip plunge into chaos, which could compel Israel to seize control of it again.
This unsavory possibility was absent from the Israeli discourse this week, as it focused on defining the Gaza campaign as "insufficient." As usual, the Israeli public chose to see the glass as half empty rather than as half full, and focused on what Israel did not achieve, rather than on what it did.
A more balanced review of the situation would recognize Hamas' achievements: It was able to survive 50 days of fighting and maintained rocket fire on most of Israel, including Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, for the entire time; it was able to disrupt the operations at Ben-Gurion International Airport; it was able to erode the resilience demonstrated by the residents of the south; and most importantly, it was able to set a narrative suggesting that its fighting has resulted in the end of the Gaza blockade.
Israel's achievements included proving that the rockets were ineffective; targeting over 5,000 terror hubs and killing 1,000 Hamas operatives; destroying the tunnel infrastructure; thwarting all of the major terror attacks Hamas had planned to carry out; increasing Hamas' isolation, and depriving it of any diplomatic achievements.
An objective review of the situation wards Israel the victory on more than just points. The problem is that this view is only a partial one, as it only scrutinizes the enemy. Once you factor in our troops the balance changes, especially given the military's procrastination and the overall failure in addressing the issues relevant to the Gaza vicinity communities.
This may also explain the dissonance between the IDF's perception of its operational accomplishments and the public's perception of them.
As far as the military is concerned, it met its objectives and then some, as Hamas ended the fighting weak, devoid of any achievements, and undoubtedly wishing it had agreed to the first cease-fire proposal offered to it on July 15.
True, Israel has had to pay a price, but the price Hamas paid was much higher, especially since 50 days into the fighting -- and under the Palestinian populations' considerable pressure -- it was all but forced to agree to the very same cease-fire proposal it rejected one week into the fighting.
Still, Hamas was not completely brought to its knees. If Israel wishes to remove Hamas' motivation to resume fire over the fact that there is absolutely no chance that the demands for an airport and a seaport will be met, it must use both carrots and sticks: Israel must be generous with allowing goods through the Gaza crossings -- so that Hamas understands exactly what is at stake -- and Israel must also be unequivocally clear about the fact that any violation of the cease-fire would mean the resumption of hostilities.
טעינו? נתקן! אם מצאתם טעות בכתבה, נשמח שתשתפו אותנו