There is a gigantic gap, almost impossible to bridge, between how the achievements of Operation Protective Edge are perceived by the public and how they are perceived by the political-security echelon in Israel. While the public feels a sense of missed opportunity, the decision makers believe that when the dust settles it will be clear the operation was a great success. This holds true for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Moshe Ya'alon, for who quiet in the south will directly affect their political careers; and within the IDF's high command there is general agreement that the positives will greatly outweigh the negatives. In theory, they are correct. Hamas failed to implement its plan of fire (five Israeli casualties from 4,594 rockets and mortars), lost its attack tunnels (32 in total), failed to perpetrate a strategic terrorist attack (via divers, hang gliders, abductions), lost many of its senior commanders and most of its infrastructure (manufacturing means, command centers, private homes), and worst of all -- brought unprecedented calamity to the Gaza Strip (some 10,000 destroyed homes and around 300,000 refugees). This scorecard, however, is only partial. Ultimately, Hamas managed to drive an entire country crazy for 50 days, bring daily life in the south to a complete standstill and force thousands of people from their homes, and implant in us the disconcerting sense that the strongest country in the region cannot truly contend with a relatively small organization (15,000 members) with extremely limited resources -- a problematic message in an era of a radicalizing Middle East. On the diplomatic front as well, the bottom line is not cut and dry. Hamas agreed to a cease-fire under conditions it consistently refused previously, and was forced to accept Egyptian mediation; Israel allowed for considerable relief (at the border crossings, with the expansion of fishing zones, and by cancelling its security conditions west of the fence) without getting anything in return. While the big issues (a seaport and airport) have been temporarily removed from the table, it has come at a price: Gaza will not be demilitarized, and it is not clear when the remains of Israel's fallen soldiers will be returned. Yet still, we should wait before giving the final grade, mainly because the two primary factors for determining the difference between success and failure -- deterrence and quiet -- are still an unknown. Israeli officials are convinced that when the scope of the devastation in Gaza becomes clear, Hamas will lose what remains of its appetite to fight for a long time to come. However, we can look at this from the opposite angle: When it understands it cannot actually deal with the public's anger and rehabilitate Gaza, Hamas will return to its familiar path -- resistance. And this is where the ball returns to Israel's court. For 50 days, Hamas dictated the rules of the game. When it wanted to -- it fought; when it wanted to stop -- there were cease-fires. Not anymore; Israel must make it clear that from this point forward -- we have the ball. If Hamas dares dig a tunnel -- it will be severed; if it shoots -- it will be met with a disproportionate response; if we learn of plans for a terrorist attack -- its mastermind will be eliminated; if weapons are smuggled -- the border crossings will be shut. Only unequivocal declarations of intent on these matters, and staying true to them if the need arises, will lead to the desired quiet. There is one other matter: The Gaza periphery communities. The government must not talk, it must do. It needs to hold its weekly cabinet meeting this Sunday at Nirim or Nahal Oz and pledge its loyalty and commitment to the western Negev. The government must prioritize housing, employment, agriculture, construction, welfare, education and mostly funds. If this happens, the Negev will bloom; if it does not -- Hamas will have won.
